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FACULTY COMMITTEE ON EXTENSION

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The Bureau of Extension,
Chapel Hill, N. C.

The High School Debating Union

History and Purpose

The High School Debating Union was organized among the secondary and high schools of North Carolina by the Dialectic and Philanthropic Literary Societies of the University during the school year, 1912-1913. It was organized to encourage debating in a definite, systematic fashion among North Carolina high school students. The query of that year was, RESOLVED, *That the Constitution of North Carolina should be so amended as to allow women to vote under the same qualifications as men.* Ninety schools took part in this State-wide debate on February 22, 1913. Sixteen schools won both debates and sent their teams to Chapel Hill for the Final Contest. The Pleasant Garden High School, of Guilford County, represented by Messrs. Grady Bowman and S. C. Hodgin, was the winner in the Final Contest, on March 7th, and accordingly was awarded the Aycock Memorial Cup.

A Part of Extension Work

During the school year of 1913-1914, the High School Debating Union moved onward with splendid success. It received the additional support of the Bureau of Extension of the University, in order to insure its permanence and enlarge its usefulness and scope. Everywhere, all over the State, it was recognized as a definite, big part of the University's effort to bring itself into a helpful relation with every community and every person in North Carolina. One hundred and fifty schools enrolled in the Union and took part in the triangular debates on March 20th, 1914. Forty-one schools won both of their debates and sent their teams, numbering 164 debaters, to Chapel Hill to compete in the Final Contest. Before an audience of 2,000 in Memorial Hall, on April 3rd, the Winston-Salem High School, represented by Messrs. Charles Roddick and Clifton Eaton, won the Final Contest and was awarded the Aycock Memorial Cup. The query was, RESOLVED, *That the Constitution of North Carolina should be so amended as to allow the Initiative and Referendum in State-wide legislation.*

The Contest of 1914-1915

The contest of 1914-1915 was the most successful which had yet been held. Two hundred and fifty schools in 90 counties became members of the Union. Representing them, 1,000 student-debaters spoke March 26th, before large audiences in cities, towns, and rural communities all over North Carolina on the query, RESOLVED, *That the*

United States should adopt the policy of subsidizing its Merchant Marine engaged in foreign trade. Fifty schools won both debates and sent their teams to Chapel Hill to compete in the Final Contest. Before another splendid audience in Memorial Hall, on April 9th, the Wilson High School, represented by Misses Lalla Rookh Fleming and Ethel Gardner, won and was awarded the Aycock Memorial Cup.

The Query for 1915-1916

The query which has been selected for the members of the Union this year is, RESOLVED, *That the United States should adopt the policy of greatly enlarging its Navy.* This question is naturally an important and interesting one and at present additional popular interest centers in it because of the European War in progress. Statesmen, writers, editors, business men and the public generally are giving careful thought to our national defense. Many advocate a greatly enlarged Navy, while others decry such a policy as needless and highly expensive. It is hoped that in general enthusiasm and magnitude the contest on this query will set a new high record for succeeding State-wide debates of the Union.

Membership of the Union

Every secondary and high school in North Carolina is invited to become a member of the Union and participate in this State-wide debate. Every school that enters will, as usual, be grouped with two others in a triangle, each school putting out two teams, one on the affirmative and the other on the negative. Every school which wins both of its debates will be entitled to send its teams to Chapel Hill to contest for the State Championship and the Aycock Memorial Cup. The triangular debates will be held throughout the State during the latter part of March, and the final contest at Chapel Hill will be held early in April. At this time the fourth annual inter-scholastic track meet of North Carolina will also be held at Chapel Hill. All of the schools eligible to participate in the Union are eligible to send representatives to the track meet.

Regulations

1. The Dialectic and Philanthropic Literary Societies and the Bureau of Extension of the University of North Carolina shall suggest the query to be discussed by the schools entering the Union, and shall fix the dates for the various contests.

2. All secondary schools of North Carolina, however supported, offering regularly organized courses of study above the seventh grade, and not extending in their scope and content beyond a standard

four-year high school course as defined by the State Department of Education, shall be eligible for membership in the Debating Union.

3. All schools accepting this offer and thus becoming members of the Union shall be arranged in groups of three, for a triangular debate, the status and standards of the schools, their proximity, accessibility, and convenience of location to be considered in forming the groups.

4. Each school of each triangular group shall agree to furnish two debating teams of two members each, the one to uphold the affirmative side of the query, and the other to defend the negative side.

5. The members of the debating teams must all be *bona fide* students of the school which they represent. To be *bona fide* students, they must be in attendance at the time of the debate, and they must have been in attendance for at least 30 per cent. of the school year up to and including the date of the debate, and must have made passing grades on a majority of their work.

6. The team debating at home shall in each case uphold the affirmative side of the query, and the visiting team the negative.

7. The schools themselves shall select and agree upon the judges of the local contests.

8. Each speaker shall have twenty minutes at his disposal, not more than fifteen of which shall be used in the first speech.

9. Any school which shall win both of its debates shall be entitled to send both of its teams to the University for the State Championship Contest.

10. In the event that one school of a triangle drops out and the committee at Chapel Hill is unable to secure a school to take its place, then the two teams remaining shall debate one another, each sending a team on the negative to the other. If either school wins both of these debates, then it shall send its teams to Chapel Hill for the Final.

11. In the event that two schools of a triangle drop out of the Union and the committee is unable to secure schools to take their places, then the remaining school shall be declared winner over the others, by their default, and shall send its teams to Chapel Hill for the Final.

12. The school having the strongest team on the affirmative side of the query and the school having the strongest team on the negative side shall be entitled to contest publicly in the University Chapel for the Aycock Memorial Cup. (The strongest team on each side of the query is to be determined by means of preliminary contests at Chapel Hill).

13. The school which shall win the debate, thus finally held, shall

have its name inscribed on the Memorial Cup, together with the names of its two winning representatives.

14. Any school which shall win in the Final Contest for two years in succession shall have the Cup for its own property.

15. All high school representatives and principals coming to the University for this contest will be met at the station by a committee and will be entertained free of cost while in Chapel Hill.

Originality of Debates

It has been suggested to the committee a number of times in the past few months that the ultimate success of the Union will be seriously hindered unless in each instance the speech of a debater represents his own individual work. This appeals to the committee as being a very sensible and timely suggestion. Accordingly, the committee wishes to ask the teachers and students to work on the debates with this suggestion in mind.

Enter Your School Now

The High School Debating Union is essentially an organization for the secondary and high schools of the state. That it possesses unlimited possibilities for usefulness to every high school pupil and teacher and to every community in the State goes without saying. Its success, however, and its benefits to those concerned, are dependent upon the support accorded it by the students and school men of North Carolina. If your school has not yet enrolled, in order that its possibilities for usefulness to you may be realized, see to it that your school —the school of which you are principal or the school which you attend, or the school in your community—enrolls immediately in the Union.

For fuller information, address

E. R. RANKIN, *Secretary,*
HIGH SCHOOL DEBATING UNION,
Chapel Hill, N. C.

The Enlargement of the Navy

Query

RESOLVED, That the United States should adopt the policy of greatly enlarging its Navy.

Limitations

For the sake of uniformity in the debates of the Union, these limitations are expressly laid down:

1. It is understood that the term "policy" refers to a line of action on the part of the Government continuing for a period of years, rather than to any temporary action brought on by varying circumstances.

2. It is understood that the proposed plan of President Wilson and Secretary Daniels, as outlined below, is to be considered as a policy of greatly enlarging the Navy; provided this plan or a similar plan be continued after the five-year period has elapsed to the end that the United States shall maintain a Navy ranking not less than second among the navies of the world.

Official Estimates of the Navy's Program

The estimates for the enlargment of the Navy as agreed upon for recommendation to Congress by President Wilson and Secretary Daniels and as they are to be considered and discussed in the debates of the Union follow:

Official estimates of the Navy's part in the Administration's National defense program as made public show that within five years it is proposed to spend $502,482,214 on construction of new ships, development of aircraft, and creation of a huge reserve of ammunition and guns.

The five-year building program contemplates construction of 10 dreadnaughts, six battle cruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 destroyers, 15 sea-going submarines, 85 coast defense submarines, four gunboats, one hospital ship, two ammunition ships, two fuel oil ships and one repair ship. The last of these vessels will be in commission late in 1924.

On naval aviation it is proposed to expend $6,000,000 during the first years and on reserve munitions $25,000,000.

With the addition of $48,518,127 for completion of ships already authorized, a total of more than half a billion dollars will be expended upon the Navy in addition to the regular budget which approximates $100,000,000 a year.

Secretary Daniels will recommend this Winter the addition to the naval personnel of 7,500 bluejackets, 2,500 apprentices, and 1,500 marines, a total of 11,500 men. With this addition it is estimated that all battleships not more than 15 years old, destroyers and submarines built within 12 years, half of the cruisers, and all of the gunboats and necessary fleet auxiliaries, can be manned and an adequate reserve be maintained for vessels on the reserve list. To officer the additional force of marines, the Secretary will recommend the appointment of one additional brigadier general, two colonels, two lieutenant colonels, six majors, one colonel and assistant quartermaster, 14 captains, 14 first lieutenants, 13 second lieutenants, and 22 warrant officers.

Additional naval officers would be obtained by increasing the number of midshipmen at the naval academy by not less than 250 men.

For the aviation corps Secretary Daniels will recommend the establishment of a special service to which civilian aviators can be appointed.

The 1917 naval estimates to be presented to Congress this Winter will total $217,652,173, an increase of $67,990,308 over last year's appropriation. Of the increase, $57,003,000 will be for new construction, $8,000,000 for munitions reserve, $2,000,000 for aviation and the balance of the total appropriation will go toward continuing departmental expenses.

The building program to be recommended for the five-year period is as follows:

For 1917, (authorized in 1916): Two dreadnaughts, $15,560,000; two battle cruisers, $11,158,000; three scout cruisers, $6,900,000; 15 destroyers, $10,500,000; five fleet submarines, $4,425,000; 25 coast submarines, $5,750,000; two gunboats, $760,000; one hospital ship, $1,250,000; one fuel oil ship, $700,000. Total, $57,003,000. (Only part of total cost of vessels appropriated the first year).

For 1918 two dreadnaughts, $26,580,000; continuing work on two battle cruisers, $11,921,000; one scout cruiser, $6,350,000; 10 destroyers, $16,900,000; four fleet submarines, $5,577,500; 15 coast submarines, $13,950,000; one gunboat, $1,140,000; continuing work on hospital ship, $1,200,000; continuing work on fuel ship, $655,250. Total, $84,273,750.

For 1919, two dreadnaughts, $37,600,000; one battle cruiser, $17,-500,000; two scout cruisers, $10,000,000; five destroyers, $10,000,000; two fleet submarines, $5,437,500; 15 coast submarines, $9,750,000; competing gunboats, $380,000. Total $90,767,500.

For 1920, two dreadnaughts, $37,600,000; two battle cruisers, $17,-118,500; two scout cruisers, $8,650,000; 10 destroyers, $10,300,000; two fleet submarines, $4,215,000; 15 coast submarines, $9,750,000; one ammunition ship, $799,587; one fuel oil ship, $700,000. Total, $89,133,087.

For 1921, two dreadnaughts, $37,600,000; one battle cruiser, $23,460,-

500; two scout cruisers, $10,000,000; 10 destroyers, $13,600,000; two fleet submarines, $3,400,000; 15 coast submarines, $9,750,000; one gunboat, $380,000; one ammunition ship, $1,766,000; completing fuel ship, $655,250; one repair ship, $1,175,000. Total, $101,786,750.
250; one repair ship $1,175,000. Total $101,786,750.

The $6,000,000 aviation appropriation would be divided, $2,000,000 for the first year, and $1,000,000 for each year thereafter. The reserve munition program would be divided $8,000,000 the first, $5,000,000 a year for three succeeding years and $2,000,000 for the fifth year.

In announcing the program, Secretary Daniels said:

"The bureau of construction and repair, owing to the increased size and protection of the new battleships, estimates that each dreadnaught will cost, including armor and armament, $18,800,000. A portion of this increase may also be attributed to the greater cost of materials, which are higher than formerly and perhaps, abnormally high, owing to the great demand caused by the war in Europe. It may be that these prices will be reduced. If so, Congress will not have to appropriate so much money. Then again, the demand for materials entering into the construction of vessels may continue to be as great as or greater than at present, so that the estimates will not be too high. The total cost of each of the other types of vessels recommended is as follows:

Battle cruiser, $17,500,000; scout cruiser, $5,000,000; destroyer, $1,360,000; fleet submarine, $1,500,000; coast submarine, $650,000; gunboats, $760,000; hospital ship, $2,450,000; fuel ship, $1,355,250; repair ship, $2,000,000.

Strength of Naval Powers

The data given below as to the relative strength of the principal naval powers was furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, as of date July 1, 1914. Owing to the state of war in Europe the Office of Naval Intelligence was unable to furnish any definite information of the relative strength of the principal naval powers of the world later than July 1, 1914.

It is shown that the United States Navy, on the basis of ships completed on July 1, 1914, was third among the navies of the world in respect to tonnage. Great Britain was first and Germany second. When vessels under construction on July 1 are completed the United States Navy will be in fourth place, surpassed by Great Britain, Germany, and France.

WARSHIP TONNAGE OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL POWERS

(Number and displacement of warships, built and building, of 1,500 or more tons, and of torpedo craft of more than 50 tons).

TYPE OF VESSEL	GREAT BRITAIN (Including Colonial Vessels		GERMANY		FRANCE		UNITED STATES	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Battleships (dreadnaught type)[1]	36	845,100	20	472,934	12	286,024	12	307,450
Battleships (predreadnaught)[2]	40	589,385	20	242,800	18	262,675	22[6]	309,282
Coast-defense vessels[3]	..	.....	2	8,168	1	8,800	4	12,900
Battle cruisers[4]	10	216,300	8	200,749	..	.....	..	.....
Armored cruisers	34	406,800	9	94,245	20	201,724	11	149,295
Cruisers[5]	91	449,815	46	177,647	9	46,095	14	66,410
Torpedo-boat destroyers	188	147,620	154	81,494	87	38,465	62	47,024
Torpedo boats	40	11,488	..	.....	135	13,426	13	2,528
Submarines	97	47,598	45	28,540	86	42,706	49[7]	.....
Total tons built and building		2,714,106		1,306,577		899,915		894,889

	JAPAN		RUSSIA		ITALY		AUSTRIA-HUNGARY	
Battleships (dreadnaught type)[1]	6	164,000	7	159,409	10	249,794	7	153,540
Battleships (predreadnaught)[2]	13	191,380	7	98,750	8	96,100	6	74,613
Coast-defense vessels[3]	2	9,086	2	10,380	..	.....	6	41,700
Battle cruisers[4]	4	110,000	4	128,000	..	.....	..	.....
Armored cruisers	13	138,483	6	63,500	9	74,020	2	13,380
Cruisers[5]	15	57,915	17	106,445	8	23,718	10	35,031
Torpedo-boat destroyers	52	22,163	135	90,412	51	31,010	18	9,450
Torpedo boats	27	3,017	14	2,132	70	11,856	63	12,738
Submarines	15	3,872	49	19,790	27	11,317	12	7,056
Total tons built and building		699,916		678,818		497,815		347,508

[1] Battleships having a main battery of all big guns. (11 inches or more in caliber).

[2] Battleships of (about) 10,000 or more tons displacement, whose main batteries are of more than one caliber.

[3] Includes smaller battleships and monitors.

[4] Armored cruisers having guns of largest caliber in main battery and capable of taking their place in line of battle with the battleships. They have an increase of speed at the expense of carrying fewer guns in main battery and a decrease in armor protection.

[5] All unarmored warships of more than 1,500 tons are classed as cruisers. Scouts are considered as cruisers in which battery and protection have been sacrificed to secure extreme speed. The word "protected" has been omitted because all cruisers except the smallest and oldest now have protective decks.

[6] Does not include Idaho and Mississippi, recently sold, or ships of current program for which contracts have not been awarded.

[7] Includes three submarines authorized in 1913; contract for fourth not yet awarded.

RELATIVE ORDER OF WARSHIP TONNAGE

Present Order (Tonnage Completed)		Order if Vessels Now Building Were Completed	
Nation	Tonnage	Nation	Tonnage
Great Britain	2,157,850	Great Britain	2,714,106
Germany	951,713	Germany	1,306,577
United States	765,133	France	899,915
France	688,840	United States	894,889
Japan	519,640	Japan	699,916
Italy	285,460	Russia	678,818
Russia	270,861	Italy	497,815
Austria-Hungary	221,526	Austria-Hungary	347,508

LETTER FROM SECRETARY DANIELS RELATIVE TO STANDING OF THE NAVY

Relative to our Navy and its standing among the navies of the world, Hon. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, in a letter addressed to the Secretary of the High School Debating Union, and dated September 20, 1915, says:

"Our last table was prepared as on July 1, 1914, over a year ago. You will note from the table which I enclose that tonnage is used as the basis of comparison. According to this table, the United States is fourth, about 5,100 tons, the tonnage of a small cruiser, behind France. Owing to the various practices adopted in the different navies, it was necessary for our Office of Naval Intelligence arbitrarily to exclude from this table any vessels which although authorized were not actually contracted for or laid down. For instance, in France and Germany a building program is authorized to take place from year to year. There are instances wherein countries have failed in actual construction to build in accordance with their authorized program. So a vessel is not included unless a contract is actually signed for its construction or if it is to be built by the Government, unless its construction has actually begun. This has excluded from inclusion in our own tonnage all the construction which was authorized a day or two before this table was issued, but all of which was actually started within a very short time afterward. If these were included it would increase the tonnage of the American Navy by about a hundred thousand tons. You will note, too, that the American Navy was reduced in tonnage because of the sale of the old battleships Mississippi and Idaho, from the proceeds of which the construction of the modern dreadnaught California will be paid."

Appropriations to the United States Navy

The two tables given below show: 1. The amounts of annual naval appropriation acts from March 3, 1883, to and including March 3, 1899; 2. Statement of the totals of the appropriations carried by the naval acts from 1900 to 1915, showing amounts for increase of the Navy, etc.:

AMOUNTS OF ANNUAL NAVAL APPROPRIATION ACTS EACH YEAR FROM ACT OF MARCH 3, 1883, TO AND INCLUDING ACT OF MARCH 3, 1899

Date	Amount	Date	Amount
March 3, 1883	$15,895,434.23	March 2, 1891	$31,541,654.78
July 7, 1884	8,860,317.11	July 19, 1892	23,543,385.00
January 30, 1885	6,120,155.48	March 3, 1893	22,104,061.38
March 3, 1885	15,070,837.95	July 26, 1894	25,327,126.72
July 26, 1886	12,989,907.20	March 2, 1895	29,416,245.31
August 3, 1886	3,500,000.00	June 10, 1896	30,562,660.95
March 3, 1887	25,767,348.19	March 2, 1897	33,003,234.19
September 7, 1888	19,942,835.35	May 4, 1898	56,098,783.68
March 2, 1889	21,692,510.27	March 3, 1899	48,099.969.58
June 30, 1890	[1]24,136,035.53		

[1] Includes $1,000,000 by joint resolution September 29, 1890, for nickel ore or nickel matte.

STATEMENT OF THE TOTALS OF THE APPROPRIATIONS CARRIED BY THE NAVAL ACTS FROM 1900 TO 1915, SHOWING SEPARATELY THE AMOUNTS FOR "INCREASE OF THE NAVY" AND SHOWING THE NUMBER AND TYPES OF VESSELS AUTHORIZED BY THOSE ACTS

Year	Appropriation	Amount for Increase, Navy	Tonnage Exclusive of Submarines	Building Program
1900.....	$ 65,140,916.67	$ 17,140,699.00	100,036	2 first-class battleships; 3 armored cruisers; 3 protected cruisers; 7 submarines.
1901.....	78,101,791.00	25,400,000.00	.....	No new construction.
1902.....	78,856,363.13	22,703,010.00	63,630	2 first-class battleships; 2 armored cruisers; 2 gun boats; 2 tugs.
1903.....	81,876,791.43	25,925,632.00	77,600	5 first-class battleships; 2 training ships.
1904.....	97,505,140.94	32,176,860.00	82,930	1 first-class battleship; 2 armored cruisers; 3 scout cruisers; 2 colliers; 2 tugs; 4 submarines.
1905.....	100,336,679.94	42,255,833.00	32,000	2 first-class battleships.
1906.....	102,091,670.27	33,475,829.00	22,100	1 first-class battleship; 3 torpedo-boat destroyers; 8 submarines.
1907.....	98,958,507.50	23,713,915.00	21,400	1 first-class battleship; 2 torpedoboat destroyers.
1908.....	122,663,885.47	30,307,962.00	123,480	2 first-class battleships; 5 colliers; 10 torpedoboat destroyers; 8 submarines.
1909.....	136,935,199.05	38,819,595.00	75,085	2 first-class battleships; 1 collier; 8 destroyers; (3 subsurface); 4 submarines.
1910.....	131,350,854.38	33,770,346.00	96,452	2 first-class battleships; 2 colliers; 6 torpedo-boat destroyers; 4 submarines.
1911.....	126,478,338.24	26,005,547.67	106,797	2 first-class battleships; 2 colliers; 1 river gunboat; 1 gunboat; 2 tugs; 4 submarines; 1 submarne tender; 8 torpedo-boat destroyers.
1912.....	123,225,007.76	20,569,373.48	77,440	1 battleship, first line; 2 fuel ships; 6 destroyers; 1 destroyer tender; 8 submarines; 1 submarine tender.
1913.....	140,800,643.52	35,325,695.00	56,530	1 battleship; 1 transport; 1 supply ship; 6 destroyers; 4 submarines.
1914.....	144,945,833.61	41,091,734.00	102,660	3 battleships; 6 destroyers; 8 (or more) submarines.
1915.....	149,676,864.88	[1]46,853,801.00	89,660	2 battleships; 6 destroyers; 16 submarines; 2 sea-going submarines; 1 oiler.

[1] Includes $1,890,000 saved on shore expenditures reappropriated for aeronautics and submarines.

Naval Expenditures of the Powers

The table given below and taken from the Navy Year Book for 1914 shows the total naval expenditures of the principal naval powers from 1900-1901 to and including 1914-1915.

Fiscal Year	Great Britain (April 1, to March 31)	United States (July 1, to June 30)	Germany (April to March)	France (January to December)
1900-1901	$145,792,850	$ 61,721,695	$ 37,173,074	$ 72,683,180
1901-1902	150,569,190	68,438,301	46,315,800	67,079,011
1902-1903	150,679,328	82,977,641	48,818,700	59,217,558
1903-1904	173,548,058	104,126,192	50,544,000	59,740,222
1904-1905	179,138,049	116,655,826	49,110,300	60,178,623
1905-1906	161,117,947	109,725,059	54,918,000	61,565,779
1906-1907	152,954,342	98,392,144	58,344,300	59,514,296
1907-1908	151,880,617	117,353,474	69,133,500	[2]60,685,813
1908-1909	156,401,161	120,421,579	[2]80,737,626	[2]62,194,916
1909-1910	181,936,341	122,247,365	[2]95,047,820	64,899,589
1910-1911	202,056,258	111,791,980	[2]103,302,773	74,102,439
1911-1912	211,596,296	133,559,071	[2]107,178,480	[2]80,371,109
1912-1913	224,443,296	129,787,233	[2]109,989,096	[2]81,692,832
1913-1914	[2]237,530,459	136,858,301	[2]112,091,125	[2]90,164,625
1914-1915	[2]260,714,275	[2] [3]141,872,786	113,993,329	[2]123,828,872

[1] Does not include amounts expended under naval works acts during the years 1896-1909, amounting to about $155,000,000.
[2] Appropriation.
[3] Includes $4,635,000 this year's allotment of proceeds from sale of the Idaho and Mississippi.

Fiscal Year	Russia (January to December)	Italy (July 1. to June 30)	Japan (April to March)	Total
1900-1901	$ 42,101,212	$ 23,829,206	[1]	
1901-1902	45,488,462	23,875,532	$ 21,373,954	$423,140,250
1902-1903	50,769,465	23,522,400	17,654,528	433,639,620
1903-1904	60,018,895	23,522,400	17,553,279	489,053,046
1904-1905	58,076,543	24,300,000	10,018,024	497,477,365
1905-1906	60,228,444	24,494,400	11,378,202	483,427,831
1906-1907	60,703,557	25,865,668	30,072,061	485,846,368
1907-1908	43,012,166	27,516,454	35,124,346	504,706,370
1908-1909	49,682,482	30,453,697	39,347,332	539,238,793
1909-1910	58,059,040	[2]31,813,885	[2]35,005,719	589,008,759
1910-1911	[2]46,520,465	[3] [2]40,595,204	[2]36,889,158	615,258,277
1911-1912	[2]56,680,915	[2] [4]40,780,987	[2]42,944,329	673,111,187
1912-1913	[2]82,019,633	[2]41,893,420	[5] [6]46,510,216	716,335,726
1913-1914	[2]117,508,657	[2]49,550,147	[5]48,105,152	791,808,466
1914-1915	[2]128,954,733	[5] [7]56,920,440	[5] [8]69,111,653	895,396,088

[6] Revised Estimates.

[1] Not available.
[2] Appropriation.
[3] Includes $4,827,568 made available 1910.
[4] Includes $3,309,220 made available 1911.
[5] Estimated.
[6] War appropriations for Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia not included in this table.
[7] Includes two additional appropriations amounting to $9,950,501 because of present European War.
[8] Includes $18,962,844 estimated for naval expenditures up to December 31, 1914, for war with Germany.

Brief

Enlargement of the Navy

RESOLVED, That the United States should adopt the policy of greatly enlarging its Navy.

Introduction

I. The question is important.
   A. It concerns the matter of our national defense, our preparedness or unpreparedness for war.
   B. The Navy has always been recognized as our primary line of defense.
   C. England, Germany, and France now have navies surpassing the United States Navy.

II. It is timely.
   A. All of Europe is now in a state of war and it has at times seemed possible that the United States might become involved in it.
   B. The United States is now a world power. Instances of our entry into international politics are shown in our taking the Philippines, in our fortifying the Panama Canal, in our relations with Central and South America, in our exchange of notes with Germany concerning the freedom of the seas and the safeguarding of American lives, and with Great Britain respecting the rights of neutrals and the maintenance of international law.

III. The question arises as to whether in accepting full responsibility as a world power, the United States should adopt the policy of greatly enlarging its Navy so as to make it equal to other leading navies or should continue its policy of the past which has been to maintain a Navy of only moderate size.

AFFIRMATIVE

I. The present position of the United States among the Powers necessitates military preparedness.
   A. Our desire to avoid war cannot guarantee us against it.
   B. Treaties are not a sufficient protection for a peaceful nation.
   C. A single nation cannot safely reduce armaments.
   D. The following may cause friction:

1. Our extended foreign policy.
2. The Monroe Doctrine.
3. The disregard by some one state of our international obligations and agreements.

E. We cannot tell what part we may have to take in the European War.
1. Our neutrality may be violated.
2. Our efforts at mediation will be better respected if we are in a position to enforce decisions.

F. We may have to intervene in Mexico.

G. We may have a war with Japan.

H. We may be drawn into war with the victor in the European War, if our interests clash in South America.

I. If war should break out, our country is likely to be invaded.

II. A powerful Navy is our most vital asset in a system of preparedness.

A. The Navy is our first and primary line of defense.
1. No attacking nation could reach us except by coming over the ocean.

B. Our coasts are hardly fortified at all.
1. An attacking force could easily land troops once it had passed the Navy.

C. Millions of lives and millions of dollars worth of property would be in jeopardy, once an attacking force had passed our Navy.

III. The United States Navy is totally unprepared to defend our country in case of attack.

A. It is fourth in respect to total warship tonnage, being exceeded by the navies of Great Britain, Germany, and France.

B. Many of our ships are slow and of an obsolete type.

C. Scout cruisers, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and mine layers are important in modern warfare, and in all of these we are deficient.

D. Our Navy has not had sufficient target practice.

E. Our supply of ammunition is insufficient.

F. We have not the officers and men to man our ships efficiently.

G. A modern Navy cannot be improvised. It takes years to
1. Train officers.
2. Build battleships.
3. Manufacture ammunition.

IV. A definite policy of greatly enlarging the Navy is imperative.

A. The lack of such a policy in the past has been responsible for our Navy's dropping from second rank to fourth.

B. A greatly enlarged Navy is needed to defend our 21,000 miles of coast.
C. A greatly enlarged Navy is needed to guarantee the neutrality of the Panama Canal.
D. A greatly enlarged Navy is needed to uphold the Monroe Doctrine.
E. A greatly enlarged Navy is needed to add weight to requests and demands of our Government.
F. Such a policy must be adopted if our Navy is to reach and maintain a position among the leading navies of the world.

V. Though our ideal may be international peace through disarmament we must meet conditions as they exist today.
A. All of Europe is in a state of war.
B. Congress and the American people have never been willing to submit to arbitration questions involving our national honor and vital interests or the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. These may be violated at any time.

NEGATIVE

I. There is no immediate possibility that the United States will engage in any war, offensive or defensive.
A. We have no reason to attack any nation, and no nation has any reason for attacking us.
B. Treaties tend to maintain peaceful relations. The Anglo-American agreement of 1817 has enabled us to maintain peaceful relations with Canada without fortifying the border.
C. None of the great European nations will be able to attack us for years to come.
D. The majority of the European people, as opposed to the military class, do not wish to make war upon us.
E. Many of the younger generation in all civilized countries are opposed to war.
F. Causes of friction are removable by arbitration.
1. Our foreign policy looks toward trade rather than conquest.
2. The Monroe Doctrine is "an obsolete shibboleth."
3. Our national Government should be given the power to force the states to live up to our international treaties and obligations.
G. We are not likely to be drawn into the European War.
1. A violation of our neutrality does not necessarily mean war.

2. It is not our business as mediator between the Powers to enforce decisions.

H. Intervention in Mexico is contrary to the policy of the present administration.

I. War with Japan is unlikely if we live up to our treaty obligations.

J. Invasion may be logically possible, but it is not reasonably probable.

1. We have been the aggressors in all our foreign wars.
2. Our geographical position makes invasion practically impossible.

II. The United States Navy is adequate and prepared to meet any demands which might be placed on it.

A. On July 1, 1914, in the matter of ships built, our Navy ranked third. Since that date contracts for much additional warship tonnage have been let.

B. Our battleships are of the latest improved type and are equipped with the most modern guns.

1. The keel of the *California* was laid in October, 1915. This battleship will be the greatest afloat when it is completed.
2. Secretary Daniels says, "The bureau of ordnance has developed a 14-inch gun that will shoot farther, shoot straighter, and hit harder than any now in use or known to be designed by a foreign country."

C. Our Navy is amply supplied with scout cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and mine layers.

D. Secretary Daniels stated on April 24th, 1915, that "The enlistment in the Navy is up to the limit prescribed by law and a part of the year we have had a waiting list."

III. It is entirely unnecessary and would be decidedly unwise for the United States to embark on the policy of greatly enlarging its Navy.

A. Absolute preparedness is never possible.

B. Our policy of a moderate-sized Navy has proved successful.

1. We have never been defeated in war.

C. A greatly enlarged Navy is not needed to defend our coast.

1. Fortified harbors are protected.
2. Unfortified coast cities by agreement of the Powers are not to be bombarded.

D. Our Navy has proved sufficiently great to guarantee the neutrality of the Panama Canal, to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, and to add weight to the requests and demands of our Government.

E. European navies will be greatly weakened by the present war.
F. Such a policy would be far too expensive.
   1. The Navy costs now in round numbers $150,000,000 annually.
   2. Our national treasury has a tremendous deficit already.
G. The money involved could be spent to much greater advantage in constructive work in education, in prevention of disease, and in social betterment work.

IV. The adoption of such a policy would incite other nations to rivalry with us and make conditions worse for all.
   A. It would destroy the influence of the United States in ending the European war and in furthering the cause of international peace.

V. Conditions as they exist today do not make the adoption of this policy necessary.
   A. The present European war could have been avoided had any one of the principal nations involved desired to arbitrate the differences existing.
   B. Questions involving our national honor and vital interests have been successfully and easily arbitrated in the past, as: the Alabama claims, the Newfoundland fisheries claims, the Alaska fur seal dispute, the Alaskan and Venezuelan boundaries disputes.

References—Affirmative

AN ADEQUATE NAVY AND THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY

(By Hon. Richmond P. Hobson, of Alabama, in the House of Representatives, January 29 and February 5, 1915.)

We have again reached the time when the Sixty-third Congress is to consider and to provide for the maintenance and development of the Navy. This is a momentous year in the history of the world. Amidst the clash of arms in all parts of the world our people have a general feeling of alarm and some misgivings and forebodings. The war area has extended until we find it in Canada to our north, in Europe to our east, in Asia to our west, and echo of internal war in Mexico to our south. Daily we see the warships of belligerent nations hovering off our shores. There has never been such a disturbed condition of the world, certainly not since the Napoleonic wars.

CONDITIONS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE BEFORE THE WAR OF 1812

Both sides in the great European struggle are taking occasion to bitterly criticize America's conduct. We have suffered already a serious interruption of our commerce and an economic dislocation requiring emergency revenue legislation for the Government and entailing hundreds of millions of dollars' loss by our people. The situation is closely analogous to the situation at the close of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when Great Britain was the moving spirit in directing allied nations against Napoleon. Indeed the situation now is more ominous than the situation at that time.

WAR WITH FRANCE IN 1800

Napoleon's resentment which led to the war with France in 1800 was not as intense as the growing resentment of the Germans to-day at the great source of supply of war materials her enemy allies are finding in America.

WAR OF 1812

The arbitrary treatment of American ships and American commerce by Great Britain to-day are closely parallel to similar treatment in the years preceding the War of 1812. The attitude of Great Britain toward America in recent years should give serious concern to all thoughtful Americans.

PANAMA CANAL TOLLS

It was exceedingly ungracious, to say the least, for Great Britain

to press us as she did over the question of simply granting free tolls through the Panama Canal to our coastwise shipping.

SHIP PURCHASE

Great Britain's attitude toward our purchase of ships from Germany is nothing short of menacing.

RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS

Her continual and arbitrary abridgment of the rights of neutrals to the great disturbance of our foreign commerce, and her arbitrary extension of the list of contraband to suit her own convenience, regardless of the Declaration of London and of other international conferences, is a serious menace to the development of our foreign commerce and infringes the just rights of all neutrals.

TIME TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

It is high time that all thoughtful Americans should pause and earnestly consider the condition of our national defense.

MUST RELY UPON OUR OWN RIGHT ARM

America never has been an aggressive Nation. She is not now and never will be. But America lives amidst the powerful military nations of the earth. As pointed out, we can not look to an international court; only the embryo, in the form of The Hague tribunal; no international parliament, only the embryo of The Hague conference, whose third convocation, due in 1915, is now being allowed to lapse. Where are the peace dreamers? Sitting idly by, without raising a finger to avert this tragedy to the little embryo. In vain have I sought to interest the Secretary of State. He also will not raise a finger, out of fear, evidently, of displeasing those belligerents who do not wish any measures to be taken to hasten the advent of peace. There is no international executive—not even an embryo.

AMERICA'S WORLD POLICIES

A nation's position among the nations of the world and its own world policies are the foundation considerations for working out a policy of national defense.

SELF-PRESERVATION THE FIRST LAW OF NATURE

For America and for all other nations, as for all living organisms, the first law is self-preservation.

DANGER OF ATTACK IN THE ATLANTIC

We have 5,300 miles of Atlantic coast line, and bays and harbors and navigable rivers leading up to the same, upon which are located,

within 15 miles of water, the homes of 15,000,000 American citizens and over seventeen billions of American property. On the Gulf coast we have the homes of nearly 2,000,000 citizens and over eight hundred millions of property; on the Great Lakes, the homes of about 8,000,000 citizens, with about seven and a half billions of property; in the great Mississippi Valley, 11,500,000 citizens and nearly nine billions of property. In addition to our mainland exposure, we must protect Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Panama Canal.

DANGER OF ATTACK IN THE PACIFIC

In the Pacific Coast States the homes of nearly 2,000,000 citizens are exposed, with nearly three billions of property. In addition to the mainland, we have the great treasure house of Alaska, the great strategic harbor and islands of Hawaii, together with the Philippine Islands, and also the Panama Canal.

MUST ALWAYS PROTECT THE FILIPINOS

Whatever may be our political relations with the Phillippine Islands, America will always protect the Filipinos, as she protects the Cubans, against military aggression.

INADEQUACY AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEFENSE BY LAND FORCES

As compared with the great nations, our regular standing Army may be considered a negligible quantity. Likewise our militia and reserve. The same may be said of coast fortifications, which are open to capture from the rear because of the lack of a mobile army for their defense.

Therefore an enemy in control of the sea could occupy Cuba, Porto Rico, and Panama, in the Atlantic; Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippine Islands, in the Pacific, all with little practicable resistance in case of attack in force. In addition to definite occupation of this outlying territory, an enemy could raid our mainland coasts in force, occupy and levy upon our great cities without any chance whatever of effective resistance until long after they could retire with their booty, after destroying our navy yards, ship building yards, arsenals, shipping, and public works. It is vain to imagine that our cities would be spared after the experience of cities abroad. It is likewise vain to imagine that the meager land forces available could make any serious resistance.

AMERICA MUST CONTROL THE SEA

In order to realize the first policy, namely, that of security of our vital interests against violence in accord with the dictates of self-preservation, there is no other recourse. America must control the sea in the Atlantic, and thereby keep the European armies in Europe,

and must control the sea in the Pacific, to keep the Asiatic armies in Asia; and since these oceans are so far apart and since nations that are liable to attack us in Europe and Asia are liable to establish and have already established alliances, offensive and defensive, we must control the sea in both oceans at the same time.

PROTECTION OF OUR COMMERCE AND FOREIGN MARKETS

America is rapidly becoming a great industrial nation, competing for the markets of the world. The jealousy of industrial nations in this competition is illustrated by the attitude of Great Britain toward Germany before the war. America need not hope to have a fair chance to gain supremacy in world commerce any more than Germany if she has no more formidable naval strength than Germany had. The alacrity with which our rights as a neutral are invaded and the quickness with which every means is sought to hamper the growth of our merchant marine at the present time clearly show that neither when Europe is at war or at peace will our commercial and industrial expansion over the seas be permitted normal and legitimate course unless we have control of the sea. Thus control of the sea must be the foundation for the security of our property rights on land and on sea.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Though the Monroe Doctrine may have been conceived with the idea of self-protection for the United States, and though from time to time its justification is based upon considerations of vital interest, nevertheless the spirit of the Monroe doctrine is our championship of the rights of the weak against the oppressions of the strong and our championship of the principle that among all strong and weak alike there shall be equality of opportunity, fair chance and no favor. This doctrine cuts off the Western Hemisphere from the extension of colonial policies of Europe and Asia. It is natural and inevitable that the security of this policy rests, and can permanently rest alone upon the control of the sea.

MAXIMILIAN AND MEXICO

When America was embroiled in a civil war the French invaded Mexico against the protest of the United States. When the war was over and America had control of the sea and her armies were ready to be turned into Mexico the French promptly retired.

GREAT BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA

In the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela the former proceeded against the latter in defiance of the expressed wishes of America until President Cleveland sent his Venezuelan mes-

sage, "Arbitrate with Venezuela or fight." The British chose the former.

GERMANY AND VENEZUELA

Germany hoisted her flag over the customhouses of Venezuela against the expressed wishes of America. President Roosevelt assembled our whole fleet at Guantanamo, then requested Germany to haul down her flag. The request was complied with.

MEXICO AFTER THE EUROPEAN WAR

When Europe is relieved of the absorbing activities of the great war what will likely be the attitude of the victorious nation toward Mexico, especially in the event that the allies are victorious and British financial interests are greatly disturbed and injured by Mexican disorder? No one can tell when or what way the issue may arise, but certain it is that America will be called on to surrender the Monroe Doctrine unless she is able to defend it, and since the countries involved, Mexico and Central and South America, are over the seas this defense will hinge absolutely upon our Navy, whether it is powerful enough to control the sea.

THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY IN CHINA

America has been the champion of the open-door policy in China, beneath which lies essentially the same principle underlying the Monroe Doctrine, namely, justice to the weak and equal opportunity to all; respect for the integrity of China and equal opportunity for all nations in their competition for the trade of China.

Russian encroachments through Manchuria continued until Port Arthur was occupied. America promptly protested and practically called on Russia to retire. We had no strong fleet and no military strength behind the fleet we had. Russia ignored our demand and remained, and from her remaining came the war between Russia and Japan. Great Britain has shown scarcely more consideration for the integrity of China than Russia. She seized Hongkong after imposing her opium from India upon the unwilling Chinese by war. She has since extended the territory first seized in the mainland in the Kaloon extension. She made a second war on China to further impose opium upon her people, and later seized Wei-hai-wei, though it appears that since the Japanese alliance she has dismantled this station. Germany has shown a similar attitude toward China, especially when she seized Kiaochow and fortified the harbor of Tsing Tau.

SAFETY FIRST

(Extension of Remarks of Hon. A. P. Gardner in the House of Representatives, January 15, 1915.)

WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH THE NAVY? ALWAYS SOME OTHER DAY

"The rule is jam tomorrow and jam yesterday, but never jam today," said the white queen in "Through the Looking Glass."

The white queen did not happen to be talking of the American Navy, but she might just as well have been doing so.

Listen to the debates in Congress and you will be convinced that the pages of history furnish an impregnable defense for this country. If John Paul Jones could change a peaceful merchantman into the *Bonhomme Richard* and defeat the British man-of-war *Serapis,* why cannot the like be done again? What man has done, man can do—such is the burden of the gentlemen who believe that American genius and American freemen need no preparation for war. Is anyone such a dastard as to deny that our gallent Naval Militia admirals can on any pleasant afternoon forsake their counting houses for the quarterdeck and smash the British super-dreadnaughts to smithereens with a fleet of converted Long Island steamers? Perish the thought.

The American air man, Wright, was the first in the wide world to build an aeroplane which would actually fly, and ever since that time we have been experimenting and inspecting and reporting and contracting and considering—in fact, we have been doing everything except building aeroplanes. On July 1, 1914, France owned 1,400 aeroplanes, while Uncle Sam owned 23, most of them out of date.

We have as many as 12 submarines on the whole Atlantic coast, not counting those at Colon in the Canal Zone. To be sure, no one has accused the outfit of being any too new fangled; but, then, pray remember that we are still arguing about the best type with which to experiment. Meanwhile the modest proportion of 11 out of these 12 divers were not in diving trim when Commander Stirling reported his fleet last November in obedience to the mobilization order.

Instead of the fleet of fast scout cruisers which the General Board of the Navy has told us that we need for our safety we have built just three, and they were never of much account, even when they were new. For about ten years we have been considering and contemplating types for scouts; but before long it is confidently expected that a satisfactory conclusion will be reached.

DAWDLE, DAWDLE, DAWDLE

And so it goes all along the line from voter to President. The fact is that the whole Navy has got into a rut. It needs a good hard jolt to get it out of the rut, and then it needs to be trimmed up and enlarged until it is a strong weapon, fit for the defense of a strong nation.

FLOATING HAS BEENS

(Speech of Hon. A. P. Gardner in the House of Representatives, January 29, 1915.)

The fastest battleship or armored cruiser which the United States has ever owned or owns today, built or building, is slower than the slowest of the nine big warships which fought last Sunday in the North Sea. The *Blucher* which was sunk because she was five knots slower than her companions, was faster than any vessel in our Navy today, built or building, except the small fry like destroyers and scouts.

Three of the five British battle cruisers, the *Tiger,* the *Lion,* and the *Princess Royal,* carry more powerful guns than any which have ever been carried by an American ship except the dreadnaught *Texas* and the dreadnaught *New York.* Great Britain has 26 battleships, built or building, which carry as powerful guns as the *Lion* and the *Princess Royal;* we have, built and building, just 6 ships which carry such powerful guns.

What we need most in the Navy today is men. We ought to have enough men to provide full crews for all our ships now in commission and in addition full crews for such of our ships "in reserve" as ought to be put in commission. There is not much use in building ships and then putting them in cold storage for lack of crews to man them. Eighteen thousand men is what we need, say Admiral Badger and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt. In my judgment, 18,000 men added to the Navy today would help our defense more than 50,000 men added to the Army.

The Navy constitutes our first line of defense, and the harbor fortifications and the field Army constitute our second line of defense. If we are so anemic that we cannot spare enough for both services, for heaven's sake let us spend the money on the Navy and let the Monroe Doctrine go. But do not fool yourself into thinking that we can enforce the Monroe Doctrine while we sit at home in our own easy chairs.

I stand for the building program of the General Board of the Navy from turret to foundation stone.

OUR INADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENSES

(By Hon. Augustus P. Gardner, of Massachusetts, in the House of Representatives.)

Mr. McKellar. Why should we build up a great standing army at a time when every other first-class nation is already at war, when every first-class nation is depleting its national and private resources, when it is destroying its trade and commerce, and when it is exerting every effort in the war that it is already engaged in? It will be 20

years before any first-class nation can get ready for another war with a first-class nation like ours. It takes money and resources to carry on a first-class war. Why, then, should we get hysterical now, and prepare for a war with a bogie man, when we know no other nation can possibly go into war with us in the next 20 or 25 years?

MR. GARDNER. That is one of the longest questions I ever heard, but if I apprehend it rightly I can answer it in this way: We want to build up our Army and Navy, which can no longer be improvised in a few months as formerly, so as to be ready to defend this Nation. So far as we can see, it is highly unlikely that we shall be involved in this present war, but we must be ready just the same, or we may be attacked or the Monroe Doctrine violated at some future time after this war is over. The gentleman is making the same argument that the French Nation made in our Civil War—in fact, that all Europe made, but which France alone had the temerity to put to the test. Like the gentleman from Tennessee, France argued that the North and the South were engaged in a death struggle, that when it was over it would be easy for any foreign nation to have the better of the winner, and so the French established the Emperor Maximilian in Mexico in defiance of our Monroe Doctrine. But France found that instead of being weaker at the end of the war the North was stronger; and, my friend, you will probably find that the winner in this European war is a pretty husky citizen when he gets through. What did the North do? What did we do? We just sent down an army and we lined our men up on the Rio Grande. We stationed our men looking over that river at the Emperor Maximilian and the French army, and every enlisted man had a copy of the Monroe doctrine in his hand, and out went the French army and down went the Emperor Maximilian. As to a lack of funds for war chests, no nation ever yet was stopped by lack of funds from going to war. We heard that same talk from the pacificists in July last summer. We heard how the bankers would never lend the money for a war, yet the international peace conference at the Lac de Constance a few days later was caught in the vortex of the German mobilization.

MR. GARDNER. The President says that naval authorities never agree as to the proper lines on which to develop our Navy. If the expression of that view is designed for an argument, then we should have no Navy whatever until the bright day dawns when all men think alike. Battleships may be out of date, but at all events British battleships have swept the commerce of Germany from the seas while British merchantmen continue to plow the waves in such security that we Americans do not hesitate to intrust them with our precious freight and our still more precious lives. Submarines and mines may have taken the place of battleships, but they have not restored German

commerce to the seas and they have not impeded the freedom of British commerce in the Atlantic. In short, then, our officers and officials tell us that we lack men for our Navy, men for our coast defense, and men for our Army; that we lack artillery and that we lack the ammunition with which to charge that artillery; that we lack great battleships to sail the seas and little scouts to act as their messengers and their eyes; that we have a sadly deficient undersea Navy and practically no overhead fleet at all.

WE ARE UNPREPARED

(By the National Security League.)

Annual report of the Navy Department, 1913. Page 31. President of General Board to Secretary of the Navy, subject—Naval Policy. "There is no naval policy except the policy as outlined by the General Board itself in 1903. This policy, as a policy, has remained a General Board policy only, without adoption by the Government or even by the Navy Department, and without being understood by the people or Congress."

Page 32. "The absence of any definite naval policy on our part except in the General Board and the failure of the people, the Congress and the Executive Government to recognize the necessity for such a policy, has already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war. This inferiority is progressive and will continue to increase until the necessity for a definite policy is recognized and that policy put into operation."

LACK OF SHIPS

Annual report, Secretary of the Navy, 1914: From the report of the General Board. Page 55. "We are deficient 10 battleships, built, building and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 program."

Page 58. Scout Cruisers. In the struggle to build up the purely distinctive fighting ships of the Navy—battleships, destroyers and submarines—the cruising and scouting element of the fleet has been neglected in recent years, and no scouts have been provided for since 1904.

Page 59. Aircraft. The Board of Aeronautics in 1913 recommended the purchase of 50 aeroplanes, one fleet dirigible and 2 small dirigibles for training. At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of aircraft of any kind owned by the Navy consists of 12 aeroplanes, not more than two of which are of the same type, and all reported to have too little speed and carrying capacity for service work.

"In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind."

Gunboats. "The Navy is very deficient in gunboats. Though the Navy list gives 30 names under gunboats, only a very limited number

of these 30 are in condition to be available for service. Some are old boats of little value, taken over from Spain, of from 400 to 250 tons or less. Of the others . . . no gunboats have been authorized since 1902."

LACK OF MEN

Page 62. "No nation in time of peace keeps all the ships of its navy fully manned and in full commission. But all leading nations except ourselves provide an active list, officers and men, sufficient to keep the best of their fleet in full commission and all the serviceable ships of their fleet in a material condition for war; and in addition to trained reserve of officers and men sufficient to complete the complements and fully man every serviceable ship of their navies and furnish a reserve for casualties."

To quickly man all of the ships of the Navy serviceable for war, including ships which are now in reserve or ordinary, with trained crews is impossible because of the absence of trained reserves.

Page 66. The bureau is of the opinion that there exists at the present time a shortage of 203 line officers, required to place in full commission all vessels of the Navy serviceable for war purposes.

Page 67. There is "an actual shortage of men to man all vessels serviceable for war purposes of 4,560 men."

WHY A POWERFUL NAVY IS NEEDED

(By the Navy League of the United States.)

Among the strong arguments in favor of a strong navy are the following:

1. The weak, or no-navy, policy in the past has resulted in greatly prolonging all of our wars, thus causing the maximum expense, the maximum loss of life, and the maximum destruction of property. A strong navy from the beginning of our existence as a nation would have entirely prevented some wars, and shortened all others, with a saving of life and money that is incalculable.

2. The navy is the only form of insurance against war. The cost of the navy has been 30 per cent less than the cost of pensions since the Revolution.

3. The navy is a splendid national public school; the modern battleship is a perfect manual-training establishment. Enlisted men in the navy are trained to be patriotic and to respect the law; they are developed physically and are employed in a dozen useful trades which improve them as men and prepare them all the better for civil pursuits.

The War of the Revolution lasted seven years, the commercial war with France two years, the war with the Barbary States four years,

the War of 1812 three years, the Florida war seven years, the Mexican War two years, the Civil War four years, and the War with Spain and in the Philippines two years. For every five years of peace this country has had more than one year of war.

The historian declares that Paul Jones and the naval commanders and privateers of the War of the Revolution caused such an increase in the rates of insurance on English commerce that the English were compelled to acknowledge our independence. The French fleet assisted. It was sea-power that won our freedom. A strong navy would have won it in two years, instead of seven.

The no-navy or weak-navy policy has been disastrous from the beginning of our national life. Immediately after the Revolution, Congress abolished the navy, despite the solemn advice of Washington, who was a strong believer in preparedness for war as an economical policy. For eight years we had no navy.

In 1797 the French, in our defenseless condition, preyed upon our commerce, and we were forced to build six frigates. The Constellation whipped the French frigate Insurgente, and our navy brought peace once more. But no sooner was this result accomplished than it was again proposed to abolish the navy. Congress "determined to endear itself to the hearts of the people by cutting down the appropriations for the navy." A few ships were retained and the others sold.

After paying $1,000,000 in tribute to the pirates of Algiers, the navy was again called upon to put down piracy.

At the beginning of the War of 1812 our navy was so small that the Government at first decided to abolish it entirely, or to keep the ships in port as harbor defense batteries. But Captains Bainbridge and Stewart induced the President to let the navy fight—with the result stated by General Upton—"the navy by its victories saved the nation from dishonor." Our Capitol was burned by the British. The only men who stood and fought at Bladensburg were the sailors under Commodore Bower. Everybody else ran away at the first volley.

During the past three years the failure of Congress to build fighting ships has caused the United States to drop from second to fourth place in naval strength, and if this policy continues we will soon drop to fifth place.

Not less than four battleships should be added to our navy every year if we are to be ready for war—i. e., if we are to have peace.

The argument for a strong navy does not depend upon sentimentalism or any rattle-brain and awful prediction. The need of a strong navy is based upon our experience of 140 years since we became a nation—which proves beyond question that the weak-navy policy has been disastrous in the extreme and that we have paid so dearly for war

that an insurance against it—the only possible insurance against it—a strong navy—is imperatively necessary.

A navy cannot be built in a short time, it cannot be improvised or bought, it must be ready, not *some* of the time, but *all* of the time, *every minute of the time.*

THE MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENSES OF THE UNITED STATES: WHAT THEY ARE—WHAT THEY SHOULD BE

(By William Howard Taft, in the *Saturday Evening Post,* Volume 187, pages 3-5, 32-3, 36-8.)

The measure of the preparation we ought to make is that which will give us defenses that, added to the difficulties of crossing the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean, will put us on an equality with any nation likely to conduct a war of aggression against us. Changed as the conditions of modern warfare are, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans still present a most valuable obstruction and defense for us against attack.

Our first line of defense, of course, would be the Navy. No attacking nation could get at us except by coming over the ocean. Therefore, it is of the highest importance that we should keep our Navy large enough and well equipped enough to equal that of any nation except England.

Why do I except England? In the first place, we have had a hundred years of peace with England. We have a border line of four thousand miles between us and Canada, undefended on either side. The defenselessness of this border in time of war would be greatly to the disadvantage of the smaller population. More than that, there has been manifested, in the hundred years we are now celebrating, the persistent determination of both peoples to settle every controversy by arbitration. We do not need to embody it in a treaty because both peoples have that mind, at any rate.

In the second place, England in her normal condition is not a nation with a large standing army so that she could raise promptly a great expeditionary force and send it to this country. She would have to make the same kind of preparation that we would.

As against other nations, however, that could at once mobilize against us a very large expeditionary force and transport it to our shores, we do need a means of defense. We need a navy that shall make the sending of an expeditionary force across the ocean to our shores so full of risk and danger that no country will undertake it. It is entirely feasible for the United States to maintain such a navy. It is much easier to secure the personnel of a navy than of an army, because it does not need so many men.

THE NAVAL PROGRAM OF 1903

Second, the spirit of the American people is not so opposed to a large navy as it is to a large army, and its expense is but a small part of what would be the expense of an army large enough to meet an army that one of the great nations of continental Europe might land on our shores if unopposed on the sea. It is in the Navy that we are to relieve ourselves from the necessity of maintaining a large standing Army to resist attack.

Our navy is not now adequate. We have fallen behind in the number of ships we have built, and we need greater speed and variety. It is true, naval art is developing, and there is a risk, if we go on, that we may spend money in directions which will not ultimately prove to be wise. Undoubtedly this war will yield most valuable lessons in determining along what lines our expenditures should be made; but we must, to some extent, share with the world the cost of discovering the best naval armaments, and should not remain idle and supine, waiting for the river of advance and improvement to run by. We have competent naval officers, who keep up with every known advance in naval science, and who are able to advise Congress and the Executive on every expert question.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

(By President Woodrow Wilson. Address before the Manhattan Club, New York, November 4, 1915.)

For ourselves we wish nothing but the full liberty of self-development; and with ourselves in this great matter we associate all the peoples of our own hemisphere. We wish not only for the United States but for them the fullest freedom of independent growth and of action, for we know that throughout this hemisphere the same aspirations are everywhere being worked out, under diverse conditions but with the same impulse and ultimate object.

Within a year we have witnessed what we did not believe possible, a great European conflict involving many of the greatest Nations of the world. The influences of a great war are everywhere in the air. All Europe is embattled. Force everywhere speaks out with a loud and imperious voice in a titanic struggle of Governments, and from one end of our own dear country to the other men are asking one another what our own force is, how far we are prepared to maintain ourselves against any interference with our National action or development.

In no man's mind, I am sure, is there even raised the question of the wilful use of force on our part against any Nation or any people. No matter what military or naval force the United States might develop, statesmen throughout the whole world might rest

assured that we were gathering that force, not for attack in any quarter, not for aggression of any kind, not for the satisfaction of any political or international ambition, but merely to make sure of our own security. We have it in mind to be prepared, not for war, but only for defense.

We feel justified in preparing ourselves to vindicate our right to independent and unmolested action by making the force that is in us ready for assertion.

It has been American policy time out of mind to look to the Navy as the first and chief line of defense. The Navy of the United States is already a very great and efficient force. Not rapidly, but slowly, with careful attention, our naval force has been developed until the Navy of the United States stands recognized as one of the most efficient and notable of the modern time. All that is needed in order to bring it to a point of extraordinary force and efficiency as compared with the other Navies of the world is that we should hasten our pace in the policy we have long been pursuing, and that chief of all we should have a definite policy of developing, not made from year to year, but looking well into the future and planning for a definite consummation. We can and should profit in all that we do by the experience and example that have been made obvious to us by the military and naval events of the actual present. It is not merely a matter of building battleships and cruisers and submarines, but also a matter of making sure that we shall have the adequate equipment of men and munitions and supplies for the vessels we build and intend to build. Part of our problem is the problem of what I may call the mobilization of the resources of the Nation at the proper time if it should ever be necessary to mobilize them for National defense. We shall study efficiency and adequate equipment as carefully as we shall study the number and size of our ships and I believe that the plans already in part made public by the Navy Department are plans which the whole Nation can approve with rational enthusiasm.

NAVAL PRINCIPLES

(By Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, U. S. N., in the *North American Review*, November, 1915.)

Without going into an obviously impossible discussion of all naval wars, it may be instructive to consider briefly the four naval wars in which the United States has engaged.

The first was the War of the American Revolution. This war is instructive to those who contend that the United States is so far from Europe as to be safe from attack by a European fleet; because the intervening distance was frequently traversed then by British and French fleets of frail, slow, sailing ships, which were vital factors in the war. Without the British warships, the British could not have

landed and supported their troops. Without the French warships the French could not have landed and supported their troops, who, under Rochambeau, were also under Washington, and gave him the assistance that he woefully needed, to achieve by arms our independence.

The War of 1812 is instructive from the fact that, though the actions of our naval ships produced little material effect, the skill, daring and success with which they were fought convinced Europeans of the high character and consequent noble destiny of the American people. The British were so superior in sea strength, however, that they were able to send their fleet across the ocean and land a force on the shores of Chesapeake Bay. This force marched to Washington, attacked the city, and burned the Capitol and other public buildings, with little inconvenience to itself.

The War of the Rebellion is instructive, because it shows how two earnest peoples, each believing themselves right, can be forced, by the very sincerity of their convictions, to wage war against each other, and because it shows how unpreparedness for war, with its accompanying ignorance of the best way in which to wage it, causes undue duration of a war and therefore needless suffering. If the North had not closed its eyes so resolutely to the fact of the coming struggle, it would have noted beforehand that the main weakness of the Confederacy lay in its dependence on revenue from cotton, and its inability to provide a navy that could prevent a blockade of its coasts; and the North would have instituted a blockade so tight that the Confederacy would have been forced to yield much sooner than it did. The North would have made naval operations the main effort, instead of the auxiliary effort; and would have substituted for much of the protracted and bloody warfare of the land the quickly decisive and comparatively merciful warfare of the sea.

In the Spanish War the friction between the United States and Spain was mainly about Cuba. No serious thought of the invasion of either country was entertained, no invasion was attempted, and the only land engagements were some minor engagements in Cuba. The critical operations were purely naval. In the first of these, Commodore Dewey's squadron destroyed the entire Far Eastern squadron of the Spanish in Manila Bay; in the second, Admiral Sampson's squadron destroyed the entire Atlantic squadron of the Spanish near Santiago de Cuba. The two naval victories compelled Spain to make terms of peace practically as the United States wished. Attention is requested to the fact that this war was not a war of conquest, was not a war of aggression, was not a war of invasion, was not a war carried on by either side for any base purpose; but was in its intention and its results for the benefit of mankind.

These wars show us, as do all wars in which navies have engaged,

that the function of a navy is not only to defend the coast in the sense of preventing an enemy from landing on it, but also to exert force far distant from the coast. The study of war has taught its students for many centuries that a merely passive defense will finally be broken down, and that the most effective defense is the "offensive-defensive."

Perhaps the clearest case of a correct offensive-defensive is Nelson's defense of England, which he carried on in the Mediterranean, in the West Indies, and wherever the enemy fleet might be, finally defeating Napolean's plan for invading England—not by waiting off the coast of England, but by attacking and crippling Napoleon's fleet off the Spanish coast near Trafalgar.

OUR FAITH

(The Navy League of the United States.)

We believe in a strong Navy not for aggression, but to defend our lands and peoples; to defend our commerce and merchant marine; to defend American policies, to defend the principle of self-government in the Western Hemisphere.

We believe in a strong Navy as an instrument to oppose militarism, with its attendant evils of conscription and autocratic government, wholly alien to democracy in the Western Hemisphere.

We believe in a strong Navy as an instrument to make obligatory international arbitration in the Western Hemisphere.

We believe in a strong Navy as an instrument to make the decrees of the proposed International Court of Arbitral Justice effective in the Western Hemisphere.

We believe in a strong Navy as an instrument to make Hague Conventions and Treaties effective and international law a reality in the Western Hemisphere.

We believe in a strong Navy because the United States has the largest responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and justice in the Western Hemisphere.

We believe in a strong Navy because the use and control of the sea is generally the deciding factor in international war.

We believe in a strong Navy because "the permanent peace of the world can be secured only through the gradual concentration of the preponderant military strength into the hands of the most pacific communities."

We believe in a National Naval Policy and endorse the recommendations of the General Naval Board, a body of authoritative experts, for four new battleships a year until an ultimate battleship strength of forty-eight ships, with necessary auxiliaries, is secured.

NECESSITY FOR PREPAREDNESS

(By Hon. E. W. Pou, of North Carolina, November 3, 1915.)

When the present war ends the United States will occupy a position of pre-eminence it never occupied before. The era of prosperity is already here. This very prosperity the Nation is destined to enjoy. The commanding position it is destined to occupy will arouse the jealousy, the hate of the Nations out of whose calamity we have benefited. Let any one take a map and run his eye along the coast line of the Nation, let him count the cities absolutely unprotected at this time, let him estimate the wealth of these cities. He will see that billions of dollars of property could be destroyed while our country is helpless to prevent it.

China is a giant when compared to Japan, but Japan made China yield to the most amazing series of demands any Nation has required of another in modern times. Some of these demands were positively ludicrous, but Japan, a small Nation, comparatively speaking, was prepared and China was not.

Germany was prepared and is winning victories. England and France have just borrowed $500,000,000 over here, a sum which will not last them for 30 days in the present war. Germany has borrowed more than $2,000,000,000 from her own people who appear to be able to finance the war for an indefinite period.

So long as we are helpless to protect ourselves it seems to me we can not afford to run the risk of dealing with all Europe armed to the teeth.

What utter folly to talk about demanding observance of our Monroe Doctrine unless we have a Navy adequate to back up whatever we may decide we have a right to demand.

How impotent we are to hold to strict accountability all who violate the rights of Americans on the sea and elsewhere unless we have a Navy great enough to enable us to hold to strict accountability in the event some other Nation refuses to render account for wrong or injustice done our citizens.

THE NAVY: A POWER FOR PEACE

(By Hon. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, in the *World's Work*, Volume 28, May, 1914.)

Since 1898, partly due to results growing out of the Spanish-American War, partly as a result of greatly increased foreign commerce, partly because the Nation has through its representatives adopted a more definite position in relation to other nations, as for example its most honorable course with reference to the open door in China, and later the recognition of the Republic of China, we have come into closer contact with other peoples and in a more extended field than ever

before. We have definitely accepted the responsibilities of a world power, not because we seek increased territories or military glory, for these are foreign to our principles and our desires, but because we believe that we can be a force in bringing about higher standards of civilization and usefulness and can aid in extending governments by and for and of the people. If a naval force was necessary in the past, it is more necessary to-day because of these added responsibilities and fields of interest. It is a significant fact that more ships of the Navy have been employed on duties connected with our international relations during the last two years than in any previous period of peace in our history. These duties have been undertaken to promote peace, thus emphasizing the truth that until there is an international agreement to end the excessive competition in armament and battleships, this country must maintain a strong Navy for its own usefulness and to promote the peace of the world.

Earnestly hoping, as we do, for international agreements looking to peace and to an end of policies of military expansion which impose constantly increasing burdens upon tax-payers, this country could have greater voice in bringing about this new and better day by its own preparedness than if other nations supposed it was urging a peace program because it lacked an adequate navy to protect its interests. The only nations that will be invited into conferences desiring to reduce the burdens of preparation for war are those nations that are building navies and are able to maintain any right that they may assert.

THE MILITARY NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES

(By Henry L. Stimson, Ex-Secretary of War.)

First: An adequate and efficient Navy as the primary line of defense.

In our need of an adequate and efficient navy the United States comes second only to Great Britain. We have 21,000 miles of coast line and a rapidly increasing commerce to defend. The general purpose of a navy is purely defensive, although tactically it must always be able to act on the offensive for the purpose of making effective defense of the country. Standing by itself, a navy is not designed for military aggression, such as the invasion of another country. Its function, on the contrary, is to defend our own country and our commerce against such aggression. Yet, in order to do this, it must be able to seek the enemy's fleet and attack it wherever the conditions for American success are most certain. To scatter the fleet or to tie it down to operations near our own coast is to destroy its real defensive ability. In the Napoleonic wars, England was saved from invasion by victories of her fleets which took place hundreds of miles away from her coasts;

and a policy which would prevent our own fleet from adopting such a course of operation would be hazardous to our safety.

These considerations, in addition to the fact that we have distant foreign possessions, require that we should have a seagoing navy of adequate size and efficiency. The many vital questions which are still unsettled in naval tactics require that we should have a navy which is up-to-date in all of the various branches of the service.

As a matter of fact, naval authorities today agree that not only has our Navy been falling behind, in its general relative strength, to that of other nations, but it is strikingly deficient in certain vital particulars. It is extremely short in personnel; it is deficient in the number of our capital ships; it has no battle cruisers and practically no scout cruisers; it is extremely lacking in effective submarines and destroyers.

In view of the fact that the Navy is practically our only existing defense today, its needs should meet with the promptest and most earnest attention.

OUR NAVAL REQUIREMENTS

(By Robert W. Neeser, Director of the Navy League, in "Our Navy and the Next War.")

On July 1, 1914, Germany had 17 dreadnaughts and battle cruisers in commission against 8 for the United States, while Japan holds only 4. In two years more, 1916, Germany would have had 28 dreadnaughts and battle cruisers against the United States' 12 and Japan's 10. If our policies are in conflict with those of Germany, by what course of reasoning can we dare to say that 12 dreadnaughts are sufficient to maintain our integrity against 28? In armored-cruisers strength Germany, the United States, and Japan are about equal. In cruiser strength, the advanced cavalry of a fleet, in 1916, Germany would have had 56, the United States 14, and Japan 13. In destroyers, Germany 154, the United States 62, and Japan 52. In submarines the United States will, at that date, be on an equality with Germany and will be in advance of Japan, but the German submarines are all of greater tonnage than those of the United States, and their effectiveness with the fleet will be vastly greater. We thus see that the United States has built a naval force at haphazard and without considering what is to be its ultimate use. It is not the fleet of our policy. It can neither defend the Monroe Doctrine in the Atlantic nor force the open door in the Pacific. Its weakness in scouts and destroyers for the purpose of locating an advancing enemy in the Atlantic and bringing it to action is lamentable. Its power to carry on war in the Asiatic is rendered ineffective by its lack of auxiliaries and a secure base in the far East from which to operate.

EXCERPT FROM SPEECH OF PRESIDENT WASHINGTON TO CONGRESS, DEC. 3, 1793

I cannot recommend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of our duties to the rest of the world, without again pressing upon you the necessity of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defense. There is a rank due to the United States among nations, which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known, that we are at all times ready for war.

References—Negative

LETTER ON "PREPAREDNESS"

(By Hon. Claude Kitchin, of North Carolina, September 4, 1915.)

I am opposed to the big Navy and Army program now being agitated with so much energy throughout the country, especially by the jingoes and manufacturers of war equipment and their subtle, ramified, organized and powerful influences. I shall not support in the next Congress the eight, six or four battleship or dreadnaught proposition, nor the 500,000 or 250,000 army increase proposition, nor the $500,000,000 (more than double the annual appropriations heretofore) appropriation proposition for the Army and Navy.

I shall not vote for any increase in the Naval Appropriation Bill for an extra-battleships program. If the Government has any extra money to spend, and must spend it on an extra increase of Naval Construction, then, in my judgment, it should be spent on the increased construction of submarines, torpedo destroyers, scout-ships and other auxiliaries, including air craft, and in enlarging our capacity to manufacture and lay mines—mainly on submarines and mines—and not on additional dreadnaughts or battleships.

Germany has her big, magnificent fleet of battleships, cruisers, etc., lying unmolested in her harbor. Great Britain and her allies have a battleship fleet nearly four times as large and powerful and a torpedo fleet over four times as large. Why don't the Allies go in and destroy the German fleet? You answer, submarines and mines. That answers largely the question of our "defensive preparedness." If a few submarines and mines (and Germany hasn't as many submarines as we have) can protect, and keep unmolested, the German fleet and her harbor and hold at bay for hundreds of miles a fleet four times as big and as powerful, why couldn't submarines and mines protect with equal assurance our fleet and our shores?

But why should we be in such a hurry to make big appropriations for the Army and the Navy? Why should Congress make such a wild rush to tax the people more? Where is the necessity or the wisdom? If there ever was a time in the history of our Government when the Administration, Congress, and the people, should consider with deliberation, and without excitement and without haste, a military and naval construction policy it is now. Just stop and give a moment's calm thought to the situation.

First. Our Navy and Army is stronger, better equipped, with more ammunition and in every respect more efficient today than ever before.

We have now under construction and authorized for the Navy more vessels than ever before—50 per cent more in money and in numbers than ever before; more dreadnaughts under construction than ever before—nine in number. During the two years of the Wilson Administration Congress authorized the building of dreadnaughts to cost over $70,000,000; the last two years of Taft's Administration dreadnaughts costing about $26,000,000 were authorized. This ought to satisfy the dreadnaught jingo and trafficker, certainly 'till we construct other more useful and necessary craft. The dreadnaughts authorized in the last Congress will not be completed until three or four years, and the dreadnaughts, if authorized by the coming Congress, cannot possibly be completed within four or five years—and the war goblins could eat us up alive by that time. Relatively, considering the requirements and demands of the present war upon all other Navies, we have the strongest and most powerful Navy on earth—sufficient to defend our country and protect our rights on the seas or elsewhere against any nation or any possible combination of nations during the continuance of the present European War. After the war terminates, what nation will have the design or the power to attack us?

Second. We are in less danger from a foreign foe than ever before in the history of our country. Even if we were not, a foe has less power to harm or strike us than ever before. We are now absolutely in no danger of attack or invasion. In fact, the invasion by a foreign country from across the sea and the landing of an army upon the soil of another, equipped with mines and submarines, is a thing of the past and an impossibility, and no nation will ever attempt it. Every nation capable in the least of coping with us has its hands "full to its elbows" of the European War. Even if any had designs upon us, or if we would declare war against any, not one could send a soldier or a ship against us. It could spare neither from the exactions of the present conflict. If, as so many of the jingoes and war traffickers demanded, we had unfortunately had an actual rupture with Germany, which most wisely and fortunately was avoided, (thanks to the patient, resolute, level-headedness and big comprehension of the President), she could have spared neither a soldier nor a ship to engage us. Great Britain or France, by declaring war against us, would whip herself and allies on land in less than six months, without our arming a soldier or moving a vessel. Where is the danger now—where are the war goblins to catch our people to come from? Even the Japan goblin, specially fixed up for so many years by Hobson and the jingoes, at the time of each annual Naval Appropriation Bill, is now being laughed at by the kindergarten children. Where is the danger in the future? After the conclusion of the present war, every European nation will be so exhausted in men, money, credit, and material resources and its people

so burdened with billions of debt and taxation and its land so filled with millions of maimed and crippled and many more millions of widows and orphans, that not one could even think or dream of war with the United States, the biggest, richest, strongest power on earth, with its 100,000,000 people, and it billions of wealth and unlimited resources, fresh, untouched, unimpaired, unless our Government, yielding to the jingoes and war traffickers, would take it by the nape of the neck and pull it into a fight with us.

Third. The conditions of our Treasury and our revenues and the necessities of the Government are less able now to permit increased appropriations than ever before. The Treasury has felt most heavily the burdens of the present war. Our general surplus fund of over $150,000,000 has almost approached the vanishing point; our deficits are annual and monthly; our revenues have diminished; we have strained the nerves of the Government to get sufficient revenue to meet its ordinary expenses; we have been forced to levy an emergency tax, and still the surplus fund is diminishing; our deficits still exist; our revenues still insufficient. I repeat, if there ever was a time in the history of our country when Congress and the people could look with complacency upon the safety of our situation and consider a military and naval construction policy with deliberation, without excitement and without haste, it is now. When I sit down, away from the noise and howling of the jingoes and war traffickers and their yelping pack, and calmly contemplate our exact situation, a Navy and Army stronger, better equipped, more efficient than ever before, with more battleships, more dreadnaughts, more submarines, more destroyers, more auxiliaries being built than ever before, with less danger from a foreign foe, and, even if inclined, with less power to strike or harm us than ever before, in absolutely no danger from any, with decreasing revenues, vanishing surplus, growing deficits, an extra levy, and then not enough money to meet the ordinary expenses of the Government, with those charged with the responsibility searching every avenue for a way to get sufficient revenue during the continuance of the present war to satisfy the absolute necessities of the Government, with one section of the country with its 20,000,000 of people pressed to its knees by the burdens of the European War, and then think of some of our usually level-headed, patriotic people catching the fright and fever, which the jingoes and war traffickers have spread, and chiming in with their senseless wailing over our "dangerous unpreparedness" and their yelp for a big Navy and a big Army! dreadnaughts! battleships! 500,000 standing army! for millions and hundreds of millions of additional appropriations, for more burdens, more taxation, more deficits, and no surplus and no balances, I catch myself asking, What in God's name is the matter with our people? It seems to me that all of us can afford

to wait, except the jingoes and war traffickers, who must take advantage of the scare and excitement among our people provoked by the European War and aggravated and intensified by their organized efforts, to whoop it up for a big Army and a big Navy, for big contracts and big profits; otherwise, their day and opportunity is lost. They must hurry; they must rush. Congress need not, and, I trust, will not.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE INCREASE OF THE ARMY AND NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE PRESENT TIME

(By the American League to Limit Armaments.)

I. MILITARY NECESSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

A. Thanks to the geography of our location, separated from any of the great military nations by thousands of miles of ocean, we are protected by nature from attack. To land a force of 250,000 men upon our shores is a herculean task for any nation even if we had no navy.

B. Our population which is drawn from the very flesh and blood of Europe is the last upon which any nation of Europe wish to bring disaster and death.

C. Our commerce and our trade are desired by every nation. In 1913 our exports to Europe amounted to $1,479,074,761, and our imports from Europe amounted to $892,866,384, while in 1914 our exports to Japan amounted to $51,205,520, and imports from Japan amounted to $107,355,897.

D. Freedom from political alliance: We have avoided all alliance which would entangle us in the political intrigues of the world.

E. Our history has been that of a leader in peace and arbitration. For a hundred years we have had no wars except those in which we were the aggressor, except only the Civil War, and in that time even with our long Canadian boundary undefended there has been no war with England, despite many causes of irritation including the Alabama claims, the Trent affair, the Venezuelan difficulty, the Newfoundland fisheries and the establishment of almost every mile of the boundary line itself.

F. Our disinterestedness in the world grab for colonies. We have not been in competition with the nations whose population has grown too great for their borders and who must find an outlet for their surplus.

II. OUR PREPAREDNESS TODAY

Admiral Fletcher, who is the head of our Navy, and Secretary Daniels, our Secretary of the Navy, have both testified that our Navy is efficient. (The battleship Texas in recent target practice, made eight consecutive hits on moving targets at 30 x 20 feet at 8,000 yards.)

As Secretary Daniels said in his recent speech at the launching of the superdreadnaught Pennsylvania:

There never was a time when the Navy was so powerful, so ready, so efficient as now. Nor has there been a year when the fleet has given so much time to target practice, maneuvers, war games and practices as the present year. Skill, modern adaptation, new tactics, are being carried out day and night. The motto of the Navy today is "training, training and more training; practice and more practice." Nothing else keeps ships and men fit. Today they are fit and ready.

III. OUR EXPENDITURE TODAY IS AMPLE FOR A MUCH GREATER EFFICIENCY

A. The recent Congress appropriated:

For the Navy.....$151,000,000
For the Army.....$103,000,000

According to Arthur W. Allen, a writer for the World Peace Foundation of Boston, Mass., our expense per soldier is $1,300 as against expense by any European nation per soldier of $400. With less than 13 per cent of the number of men Germany had in her army in 1911 and 1912, we spent 53 per cent as much as she did.

B. We maintain useless forts and navy yards: The case of Fort D. A. Russel at Cheyenne, Wyo., is an example. It has cost up to 1911 a capital investment of $4,925,000 not including maintenance and repairs. This fort is distant

	MILES
From Canada, the nearest point on the railroad	1,084
From Puget Sound	1,463
From San Francisco	1,266
From Los Angeles	1,304
From El Paso, Texas	837
From Galveston	1,230
From New York	1,912

In the words of Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer, "The United States has more than twice as many first class navy yards as Great Britain which has a navy twice the size of ours. We have three times as many navy yards as Germany which has a navy larger than ours."

C. An increase in armament such as is suggested would not insure us against invasion. Ex-Secretary of War Stimson says, "We have 21,000 miles of coastline. If we were to undertake to fortify that coastline so that nobody could land upon it, we would have the entire American people doing nothing else except standing upon their border and spending all their money for that purpose."

IV. THE RESULT OF ARMAMENT

A. "Armaments are a challenge," says W. Morgan Shuster. If we arm, another nation arms and so we reply with more armament and the mad race goes on, one arming against the other and neither achieving permanent advantage but both paying the bill.

B. Armaments beget war: To quote King Albert of Belgium:

"This was was unavoidable. It had been postponed several times within the last few years and if it had not been for England's efforts it would have come at the time of the last Balkan crisis. Germany had been piling on armament for years, had been building up a war machine so perfect and so powerful that at a given time it was bound to start itself. When you have built a monster ship you cannot continue piling on weight all the time or the day will come when the vessel will slip off the ways of her own accord. The thing has happened in more than one shipyard."

Congressman Gardner, whose speech in Congress started all this agitation for increased armaments says, in rebutting the pacifists' great argument that a man armed with a revolver going about is the very man who gets into trouble: "It is true he is the very man who gets into trouble, but he does not get into trouble because he carries a revolver, but because he is a trouble maker and because he is looking for trouble and because he is a troublesome sort of man."

Is the United States that kind of a nation, "a trouble maker," "a looker for trouble," "a troublesome sort of nation"? But we might like to try our armament if we had it.

V. OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION TODAY

The influence of the United States as a world power has grown, not by our reliance upon our Army and our Navy, not by our sending round the world a white squadron, not by our wars which for the last hundred years have all been wars of aggression against weaker opponents, but (1) by our trying to establish a diplomacy of frankness, (2) by our withdrawal of our troops from Cuba after we had twice occupied that island for police purposes, (3) because we paid helpless Spain $20,000,000 for the Philippines, (4) because we returned the Boxer indemnity to China which they are using to educate their young men in America, (5) because we have refused to interpret the Panama Canal treaty to our special advantage, (6) by our support of the Hague Tribunal, (7) because we have refused to profit by the chance to grab Mexico, (8) because we have spent ourselves and our money in relieving suffering the world over, (9) because by the hands of the multitudes of men and women from all the countries of Europe who have come to us to avoid the military burdens of Europe, we are forming

links in the lasting chains of friendship and explaining the principles of democracy.

Alfred Nerinex, burgomaster of Louvain, speaking of America's swift aid to his people, said: "The most powerful army in the world cannot Teutonize Belgium, but America armed with bread is Americanizing Belgium."

In the words of Congressman Swager Shirley:

"The American people in the council of nations will desire always to lead, but never to drive, and in just the proportion that they are unwilling to drive, so are they determined not to be driven.

"No military policy that seeks to make us so strong that we may compel what we cannot invite will ever meet with the approval of our people."

The militarists say that the peace movement has been a failure. Ask them if the war movement has been a success?

The militarists have had control all through the world's history and have brought the world to the worst situation in which it has ever been. Pacifists could not possibly do any worse, so why not give them a chance?

THE PREPAREDNESS OF AMERICA

(By Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, in an address delivered at the meeting to organize a League for the Limitation of Armaments held at the Railroad Club, New York, December 19, 1914.)

When we are told in terms of most vivid eloquence that we must be prepared for war, I ask "For what war and for war with whom?" Are we to be prepared for war with the Dominion of Canada, our neighbor to the north? If so, how shall we set about better protecting the long, invisible line that separates the Dominion from the territory of the United States, extending over more than three thousand five hundred miles, than we have been doing for one hundred years? We have protected it so thoroughly that a century of peace has marked the relations of the two peoples on either side of this undefended line. How better can we protect our valuable commerce on the Great Lakes than by adhering with rigid insistence to the terms of the Rush Bagot agreement, now nearly one hundred years old, by which we limited ourselves to an armed force on the lakes of two small and long since antiquated gunboats?

But if we are not to be prepared for war with Canada, are we to be prepared for war with Europe? If so, with what nation in Europe, and why are we to prepare just now? There would have been some theoretical force five years ago in the argument that we should be prepared to defend ourselves against invasion from across the sea; but today, when our friends in every land are bleeding to death before our

eyes, when the nations of Europe are exhausting their manhood, impoverishing their resources, destroying their commerce and their trade, bankrupting their treasuries and using up the raw materials of armaments in the construction of the completed instrumentalities of death—why, when the nations of Europe are about to be reduced to helplessness through exhaustion and starvation should we arm ourselves against any one of them? Who is this invisible, this unknown, this unheralded enemy against whose attack we are to prepare ourselves at such great expense? As practical men and women dealing with facts and facing the realities of politics and of life we ask our militaristic friends for a bill of particulars. Are we to arm to the teeth and draw our resources away from that needed social and industrial improvement which thrusts problems upon us on every hand in order to expend them upon useless armaments against nobody?

And whose suspicions are we to arouse? When the whole world is looking to us and when the wise men of every nation are saying to America, "You at least are free from the curse of militarism, you are at least are in a position to exercise moral suasion and moral leadership," shall we at such a moment climb down from that high position of consequence in order to prepare ourselves to take part in the terrible turmoil of physical conflict and public murder? I say, no.

In a famous book, Mr. Herbert Spencer traced the history of civilization from a period of militaristic to a later period of industrial organization and life. He indicated just what had happened in the world as mankind made this progress and he pointed out in what ways men had advanced and how they had acquired wealth, intelligence, comfort and manifold privileges by shedding the old clothes of militarism and putting on the garments which belong to a life of free and competitive industry. We do not wish to go backward; we do not wish to turn back the hands on the clock of progress and return this nation of ours to the earlier and cruder militaristic stage of civilization. We wish rather to pass on into a new and third stage which opens before us as we speak.

As Mr. Spencer traced the progress of civilization from militarism to industry, so to-day we can almost see the progress of civilization from industrialism to the stage of a new and higher morality, to a new and higher conception of international conduct and to an enforcement by reason and morality of those high standards of judgment and action that mark the civilized man in every country in the world.

For a contest to gain the position of leadership in that movement, this nation is prepared. For such a struggle America is armed. By confining our army and navy—sufficient, competent and well furnished—to the proper limits of their activity in a democracy, we shall then keep ourselves free to build that great structure of wisdom, justice, amity

and peace on which the continuance and advancement of civilization absolutely depend.

Therefore, I do not conceive of this gathering in terms of protest; I conceive of it rather in terms of an offering of constructive leadership in a great forward movement. We will not permit ourselves to be weighted down with the discarded armor of the Middle Ages, the only proper place for which is in the museums of battered Europe. We wish to be set free. We wish our children to be free. We wish our minds, our labor and our activity to be free. We wish our nation to be free to continue to build a great and beautiful temple of freedom to which the wise and good of every nation will continue to repair, and toward which the nations of stricken Europe will turn for the friendly hand of helpfulness when the sun sets on those continental fields of carnage yonder.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S DEFENSE PLAN

(Statement by Hon. W. J. Bryan, November 5, 1915.)

From my view of the subject, the plan which the President proposes is not only a departure from our traditions but a reversal of our National policy. It is not only a menace to our peace and safety, but a challenge to the spirit of Christianity which teaches us to influence others by example rather than by exciting fear.

The President says that we should be prepared "not for aggression but for defense." That is the ground upon which all preparation for war is made. What Nation has ever prepared for war on the theory that it was preparing for aggression? It is only fair to assume that the European rulers who are involved in the present war thought that they were contributing toward the maintenance of peace when they were making elaborate preparations for defense. It is a false philosophy, and being false, it inevitably leads into difficulties. The spirit that makes the individual carry a revolver—and whoever carries a revolver except for defense?—leads him not only to use it on slight provocation but to use language which provokes trouble. "Speak softly but carry a big stick" is one of the delusive maxims employed by those who put their faith in force. There are two answers to it—first, the man who speaks softly has not the disposition to carry a club and if a man with a soft voice is persuaded to carry a club his voice changes as soon as he begins to rely upon the club.

If there is any truth in our religion, a Nation must win respect as an individual does, not by carrying arms, but by an upright, honorable course that invites confidence and insures good will. This Nation has won its position in the world without resorting to the habit of toting a pistol or carrying a club. Why reverse our policy at this time?

The President himself admits that there is no reason for change. He says:

"The country is not threatened from any quarter; she stands in friendly relation with all the world. Her resources and her self-respect and capacity to care for her own citizens and rights are well known." And to make the statement more emphatic he adds, "There is no fear among us."

If we're not threatened by any Nation, if our relations with all Nations are friendly, if everybody knows that we're able to defend ourselves if necessary and if there is no fear among us, why is this time chosen to revolutionize our National theories and to exchange our policy for the policy of Europe? Why abandon the hope that we have so long entertained of setting an example to Europe? Why encourage the Nations of Europe in their fatal folly by imitating them? Why impose upon the Western Hemisphere a policy so disastrous? May we not expect all Latin-America to be stimulated to preparation if we enter upon a new era of preparation? And will not such a policy make conflicts between these Republics more probable.

We shall do infinite harm to the neighboring Nations as well as to ourselves if we are drawn into this policy which provokes war by a preparation which is impossible without a large increase in taxation and the arousing of a military system which sets up false standards of honor. We are now spending more than $250,000,000 a year on preparedness—ten times as much as we are spending on agriculture—and I feel sure that the tax payers are not in favor of increasing this sum at this time when a change is not only unnecessary but a menace to our National ideals.

There has not been a time in 50 years when there was less reason to add to the expense of the Army and Navy, for we are not only without an enemy but our preparedness is increasing relatively as other Nations exhaust themselves. And there never was a time and there never has been a time in our whole history when our duty to the world more imperatively demanded self-restraint and the counsels of peace.

THE PEOPLE VS. THE SPECIAL INTERESTS

(Letter from Hon. Wm. J. Bryan, to readers of the *Commoner*, October, 1915.)

Another fight is on between the people and the special interests. Ex-President Roosevelt is bellowing for war. He wants this nation to enter the present conflict, and his chief adviser, Geo. W. Perkins, is identified with the steel trust which is ready to furnish the preparedness. Ex-President Taft, who has the support of all the trusts that are not supporting Mr. Roosevelt, wants to increase the army and navy appropriations one hundred and fifty millions (60 per cent) so that we

shall be able to join Europe in future wars—that is the plan of his "League to enforce Peace."

Both Roosevelt and Taft are protectionists—they believe in taxing the many for the benefit of the few, and preparedness gives an excuse for raising the tariff. The democratic party took the side of the people against the tariff barons; it took the side of the people against the people against the trust magnates, and it took the side of the people against Wall Street—the real money power back of both tariff barons and trust magnates.

Now, a new power has arisen in the land and demands control of the taxing power. It is the preparers of preparedness—the battleship builders and the manufacturers of munitions. They have been making enormous profits supplying the belligerent nations with fighting material but the European war must end some time, and what will these concerns do for watermelon-like dividends then? There is only one way to insure their continued prosperity—they must lash this country into a state of chronic fear, and then coin the fear into dollars. They already have their subsidized organs setting up a false standard of national honor—the duelist's standard; they are glorifying brute force. They are transplanting upon American soil the European tree of hatred which is bearing its bloody fruit across the Atlantic.

No time is to be lost; immediate action is necessary. Congress will soon meet, and when it meets this issue will confront it. Write to your congressman—write to both your senators. Tell them that this nation does not need burglars' tools unless it intends to make burglary its business; it should not be a pistol-toting nation unless it is going to adopt pistol-toters' ideas.

Don't let the jingoes confuse the issue. It is not a question of defense—this country will defend itself if it is ever attacked—and if that time ever comes the common people will furnish the soldiers—those who fight when the country needs fighters, and work when the country needs workers—the jingoes will be too busy making army contracts and negotiating usurious war loans to go to the front. The preparedness now demanded will provoke war instead of preventing it. Peace among nations, as among individuals, rests upon friendship and good will, not upon force or fear. Try threats and ultimatums on your neighbors and see how they work, and then you will understand the diplomacy that has reddened the pages of history and delayed the coming of universal brotherhood. Write—and write now.

THE NEMESIS OF ARMAMENTS

(By Charles Edward Jefferson, D. D., in the *Independent,* August 17, 1914.)

SPOOK NUMBER ONE

"Armaments are the only sure guarantee of peace." We have heard it a thousand times from men who seemed to know. It has been published in a thousand volumes and in ten thousand papers, and so men came to accept it as the truth. When now and then war seemed to threaten, we were assured that all would be well if the armament could be somewhat increased.

Through thirty years the work of increasing armaments has gone merrily on. It was in this way that sensible men worked for peace. The experts in these high matters were confident that a nation by making itself formidable insured itself against attack. Safety they said, depends on thickness of armor, and the only way to conserve the peace is to so load nations down with weapons that no one of them will dare to fight.

This doctrine was especially convincing to Russia and Germany, and so they have gone on adding new battalions until the dimensions of their armies have astonished the world. In these two empires the militarist ideal had been well-nigh reached. The armament on both sides was so enormous that peace was guaranteed!

When holes were punched in the doctrine by the Russo-Japanese war, and by the Spanish-American war, and by the Balkan war, the holes were covered over by the broad facts that Germany had not used her army for a generation, and that England's fleet had never fired a gun. The peace of Europe—so all the wise men said—was due to armaments.

It was a lie, and the lie is now being shot to pieces before our eyes. Armaments are provocative of war. You may increase them for a season, but at last you receive the retribution which you invited.

The least surprised men in the world today are the men who for many years have been protesting against armaments. They may be dreamers, but the silly dream that armaments are guarantees of peace never entered their mind.

For a generation they have been crying out against the waste and wickedness of the policy of "Armed Peace." They have said in season and out of season: "This cannot go on. This must not go on. It is a crime against humanity. It will drag the world back into barbarism. It will end in a tragedy which will darken the heart of mankind."

In the fierce light of the European conflagration even blind men ought to be able to see that armaments are not guarantees of peace.

SPOOK NUMBER TWO

"Armaments are a form of national insurance." The doctrine has

been promulgated throughout the world. The insurance comes high, but we must have it. A man insures his house; a nation must insure itself. Compare the annual cost of an army and navy with the aggregate wealth of a country and anyone can see that military and naval expenses are a mere bagatelle.

This has been taught by men who had the air of Sir Oracle. When they opened their lips, not a dog dared to bark.

Six nations of Europe went into this scheme of insurance. Within the last thirty years they have paid in premiums six billion five hundred and ninety-two millions of dollars, and now they find that they are not insured at all.

Some fool in southeastern Europe threw a lighted match, and instantly all Europe was in flames. Why? The whole house has been saturated with kerosene.

Military and naval budgets are not insurance, they are kerosene. Their function is to render a nation inflammable. Europe had been so repeatedly drenched with kerosene that one match was sufficient to start an instantaneouus and continent-wide conflagration: Russians, Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, all heard at once the roar of the blazing rafters over their heads. The house is burning, and now billions of dollars must be expended in putting out a fire which was made possible by the very means which were devised to prevent it. Another spook has vanished into the air.

If one-tenth of the treasure spent by Europe in the last thirty years upon her armaments had been devoted to building rational safeguards against war, the present catastrophe would never have blighted the world.

THE PREPAREDNESS OF THE NAVY

The progress made by the United States Navy during the past two years is reviewed by Secretary of the Navy Daniels in a letter, dated April 24, 1915, to President Harry A. Garfield, of Williams College.

Excerpts from the letter follow:

There are now in active service, fully commisisoned, 225 vessels of all characters, which is 36 more than were fully commissioned when I became Secretary. There are also 101 vessels of various types, in reserve and in ordinary and uncommissioned, capable of rendering service in war. We have under construction and authorized 77 vessels (9 dreadnaughts, 23 destroyers, 38 submarines and 7 auxiliaries) as compared with 54 vessels (5 dreadnaughts, 14 destroyers, 23 submarines, 3 gunboats and 9 auxiliaries) which were under construction on March 1, 1913.

The personnel of the navy is at present composed of 4,355 line, staff and warrant officers, and 53,171 enlisted men. Increases in the

number of officers are dependent almost entirely upon the output of the Naval Academy, admission to which is restricted by statute. The number of enlisted men also is restricted, and the navy is today recruited to the maximum strength allowed. There are now with the colors 5,824 more men—an increase of 12 per cent—than were on March 1, 1914.

During the first two years of the Wilson administration, upon my recommendation, Congress authorized the construction of five dreadnaughts to cost about $14,000,000 each. Stated in dollars, the Wilson administration, in its first two years, authorized seventy million dollars to be spent on the chief fighting force of the Navy, as against twenty-six million authorized during the last two years of Taft's; stated in numbers, it authorized five dreadnaughts instead of two; and stated in effectiveness, the five dreadnaughts authorized under Wilson will mount 36 more 14-inch guns than the two authorized under Mr. Taft.

The bureau of ordnance has developed a 14-inch gun that will shoot farther, shoot straighter, and hit harder than any gun now in use or known to be designed by a foreign country. Based upon former and current prices in contracts for guns and gun forgings we have saved $280,425.33.

Radio has at last been successfully installed on submarines, and more than 75 other ships, which either had no radio or whose equipment was obsolete, have been supplied with modern equipment. Three entirely new shore stations have been added to the chain: Balboa (Canal Zone), Great Lakes, Illinois, and Tutuila, Samoa.

All who would learn the truth may be assured that the Navy of 1915 is larger, better equipped and in better condition than in any previous year, and that the fleet is becoming more efficient with every passing month. "We shall take leave to be strong upon the sea in the future as in the past," declared President Wilson in his message to Congress; and in the interest of the self-respecting peace, which is the only peace worth preparing for, it is devoutly to be hoped that this strength may not be questioned by others or endangered from within. The record above outlined shows that what President Wilson promised for the Navy has been fulfilled.

NATIONAL HONOR AND VITAL INTERESTS

(By Russell Weisman. An oration delivered February 1, 1914, in the Inter-Collegiate Peace Contest, at Lake Mohonk, N. Y.)

Today no discussion is needed to show that if war is to be abolished, if navies are to dwindle and armies diminish, if there is to be a federation of the world, it must come through treaties of arbitration. In this way alone lies peace; yet in this way lies the present great barrier to

further progress—the conception which many nations, especially the United States, hold of "national honor and vital interests."

What, then, are the vital interests that can be conserved only by sabre and bullet? Nothing more, nothing else, according to various acknowledged authorities, than a state's independence and its territorial integrity.

For the United States to except from arbitration her vital interests is obvious pretense. To add thereto her national honor is extreme hypocrisy. What is national honor? No man knows. It is one thing to-day; another, to-morrow. It may involve an indemnity claim, a boundary line, a fisheries dispute. In fact, any controversy may be declared by either party, at will, to be a question of national honor. Thus in the hands of an unskilled or malicious diplomacy, any question which was originally a judicial one may become a question of national honor. What, then, will we arbitrate? Every case in which a favorable award is assured us. If we want Texas, we send an army after it. Every case that does not rouse our anger. Let the *Maine* blow up and we fight. A treaty with an elastic exception like this is a farcical sham and a delusion.

Do you ask further evidence of the hypocrisy with which our Senate parades our national honor and our vital interests to the undoing of a grand work? Search our history and you will find it in abundance. In the great case of the Alabama claims, Charles Francis Adams pronounced the construction of Confederate ships in English ports to be a violation of the international law of neutrality. This certainly was a question of national honor and vital interests, yet he pleaded for arbitration. In reply Lord John Russel said, "That is a question of honor which we will never arbitrate, for England's honor cannot be made the subject of arbitration." The case was debated for six years. Then came England's "Grand Old Man," the mighty Gladstone, with a different view. "It is to the interest," he said, "not only of England and the United States, but of the world, peaceably to settle those claims." He submitted them to a joint high commission. England lost and paid. Thus the honor of both nations was successfully arbitrated. Likewise the Newfoundland fisheries case had been a bone of contention between Great Britain and America from the day our independence was recognized. As late as 1887 it threatened to become the cause of war. No question ever arose which more vitally affected the interests of America, yet the Senate recently accepted a settlement by arbitration. Similarly, the Alaska fur seal dispute, the Alaskan and the Venezuelan boundary disputes, and the northeast boundary controversy all involved both the vital interests and the national honor of England and America, yet all were satisfactorily and permanently arbitrated. So excited were we over our northwest boundary that the principal issue of a

political campaign was "The Whole of Oregon or none! Fifty-four forty or fight!" Yet we peaceably acquiesced in a treaty that gave us neither.

ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

(By President Woodrow Wilson, December 8th, 1914.)

It is said in some quarters that we are not prepared for war. What is meant by being prepared? Is it meant that we are not ready upon brief notice to put a nation in the field, a nation trained to arms? Of course we are not ready to do that: and we shall never be in time of peace so long as we retain our present political principles and institutions. And what is it that it is suggested we should be prepared to do? To defend ourselves against attack? We have always found means to do that, and shall find them whenever it is necessary without calling our people away from their necessary tasks to render compulsory military service in time of peace.

We are at peace with all the world. No one who speaks counsel based on fact or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of realities can say that there is reason to fear that from any quarter our independence or the integrity of our territory is threatened. Dread of the power of any other nation we are incapable of. We are not jealous of rivalry in the fields of commerce or of any other peaceful achievement. We mean to live our own lives as we will; but we mean also to let live. We are the champions of peace and concord. We should be very jealous of this distinction which we have sought to earn. Just now we should be particularly jealous of it, because it is our dearest present hope that this character and reputation may presently, in God's providence, bring us an opportunity such as has seldom been vouchsafed any nation, the opportunity to counsel and obtain peace in the world and reconciliation and a healing settlement of many a matter that has cooled and interrupted the friendship of nations. This is the time above all others when we should wish and resolve to keep our strength by self-possession, our influence by preserving our ancient principles of action.

NAVY OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE

A powerful Navy we have always regarded as our proper and natural means of defense; and it has always been of defense that we have thought, never of aggression or of conquest. But who shall tell us now what sort of navy to build? We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas, in the future as in the past; and there will be no thought of offense or of provocation in that. Our ships are our national bulwarks. When will the experts tell us just what kind we should construct—and when will they be right for ten years together, if the rela-

tive efficiency of craft of different kinds and uses continues to change as we have seen it change under our very eyes in these last few months?

But I turn away from this subject. It is not new. There is no new need to discuss it. We shall not alter our attitude toward it because some among us are nervous and excited. We shall easily and sensibly agree upon a policy of defense. The question has not changed its aspect because times are not normal. Our policy will not be for an occasion. It will be conceived as a permanent and settled thing, which we will pursue at all seasons, without haste, and after a fashion perfectly consistent with the peace of the world, the abiding friendship of States, and the unhampered freedom of all with whom we deal. Let there be no misconception. The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national defense. We are not unmindful of the great responsibility resting upon us. We shall learn and profit by the lesson of every experience and every new circumstance; and what is needed will be adequately done.

LETTER FROM JOHN D. LONG, FORMER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

(From the American League to Limit Armaments, 43 Cedar Street, New York City, February 23, 1915.)

I see no objection to Congressional investigation of our resources and preparedness in that respect and of a report in due season with reference therto. But we must not let the European situation throw us into a panic. So far from its operating as a stimulus or warning to us immediately and abnormally to increase our war forces and armament, the argument, it seems to me, runs the other way. All the nations whose antagonism would be threatening to us, in case any such antagonism should arise, will come out of the present convulsion exhausted and bankrupt and with a pretty keen appreciation that years of peace are vital to their recuperation.

Then, too, if we were now at once to put ourselves on the partly enlarged war footing so urgently advocated at present, our equipment would probably be antiquated and not up to inventive advances before any emergency called for its use against a world power. I am in favor of a reasonable, normal increase of our navy for coast defenses and international police duty, and of maintaining, in ships and men, our continued rate of military preparation, but at present it seems enough to keep to that programme without getting into a panic.

Of course, it is true, as claimed, that if any chance of war with a better prepared nation should arise, our comparatively modest, but by no means inefficient, preparation might not permit us to resort offhand to the immediate arbitrament of arms. But, after all, would that really

be a sorrow, and might it not lead to some other means of adjustment that would be less bloody and costly? Would the Kaiser, who by a turn of the finger could have prevented the present ghastly horror of mutilation and death, have deliberately inaugurated it if his war preparation had been no greater than our own? And would not Germany, with its splendid people, have been all these later years as well, if not better, off commercially, industrially and socially, and in every other good thing true to modern civilization? If my memory serves me right, there is a prayer which contains the words, "Lead us not into temptation."

UNITED STATES VERSUS GERMAN NAVY

(By Samuel A. Witherspoon, *Congressional Record,* January 29, 1915.)

But there is one particular in which the evidence is now much stronger than it was a year ago. At that time we had to rely solely upon arguments and reason. We had very little support in the testimony of experts. It is true that we had the testimony of Admiral Vreeland, who, with a great deal of reluctance, contrary to his own wishes, finally was constrained to admit that the facts show that the American Navy is superior to the German Navy. And that is all we had at that time. Now, I want to call your attention to the fact that three members of the General Board and the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet have been before the Naval Affairs Committee in the hearing just closed, and every one of them testified that the American Navy is superior to that of Germany. In other words, I claim that the admissions of experts now unite with facts and arguments and reason to establish the proposition that we already have a Navy so big that it is not necessary to increase it in order to be able to resist the German Navy, and, of course, to resist those which are smaller.

And there is another thing that bears out the very same idea. You will recall that I pointed out with great detail a year ago how much superior in size the guns on our ships are to those on the German ships. When we were building 10-inch guns they were building 9.4-inch guns. When we were building 12-inch guns they were building 11. When they built 12-inch guns we were building 14-inch guns. Their guns have always been very much smaller than ours. I asked a very brilliant naval officer to explain why that was, and his explanation was that the German Navy was constructed with a view to having war with its neighbors. He said in that country they nearly always have fogs on the sea and the weather is rarely clear, and necessarily a naval engagement over there would be at very close range, and at very close range those smaller guns are as good as the big ones, but nobody would build ship to fight in such a country as this and equip that ship with those small guns.

PACIFISTS AND PREPAREDNESS

(By David Starr Jordan, Chancellor Leland Stanford, Jr., University.)

The question of our own preparedness for war seems to be of the kind we call academic, for we want war with nobody and nobody threatens war with us, while meanwhile the great "powers" of the world are dissolving before our very eyes.

In the United States, no one advocates disarmament under present conditions. For this there are two main reasons; it would not be done, and the policy of a nation should have continuity. A sudden change of any sort is likely to be followed by a sudden reaction. Besides, the whole armament question is only an incident in international conciliation. The introduction of fair play in place of diplomacy would do away with senseless rivalry. Nations are not attacked because they are unarmed, nor let alone because they are heavily equipped. In so far as armament effects peace, nations are mostly armed through rivalry, and armament rivalry is the first stage of war. The forces which make for peace are, primarily, to be law-abiding, second, to be just and helpful. Over-armament is a positive danger, as the conditions in Europe show. Armament is a means to victory, and victory implies war, with defeat and humiliation and the aftermath of hate.

More than "preparedness" for war we need rather "preparedness" for our constructive role in rebuilding the ruins of civilization. What we have done in Belgium, France and Serbia, what we shall do whatever distress calls for us, shows what should be our place when the storm is over.

AN INTERVIEW

(By Nicholas Murray Butler, in the New York *Evening Post*, December 7, 1914.)

Our people can have war with somebody or almost anybody in due time and on some excuse if they want to go to the trouble and expense to prepare for it. They can have peace with anybody or everybody by preparing for that.

The true alternative to a policy of new and greatly enlarged military expenditures under the pretext of national defence is the policy of moral and intellectual leadership in the constructive work of international co-operation. Personally, I have very little doubt as to which alternative the American people will choose to follow when they clearly understand the situation.

In modern democracies the function of the army and navy are police, philanthropic, and sanitary functions. Our army and navy have performed these functions admirably and well. Let them continue to do so. Keep them efficient for doing work of this kind, but put behind us forever the notion that we must arm in peace as a preventive of war, and that we must be perpetually defending ourselves or getting ready to defend ourselves against new enemies. No people will be hostile to us unless we, by our conduct, make them so.

Bibliography

A list of publications containing valuable material on the query under discussion is given below. The books and magazines can be secured direct from their publishers, and the Senate and House Documents can be secured through the North Carolina Senators and Representatives in Congress, or from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. If obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, they must be paid for in coin or money order (not stamps) at from five to ten cents each. It may be possible in some instances to secure them free of charge from the Senators and Representatives. Included in the bibliography are the names of a number of organizations and bureaus that will be glad to furnish material as far as they are able.

GENERAL REFERENCES

The Bureau of Extension of the University of North Carolina will furnish material in addition to this bulletin, such as it may be able to obtain from time to time. Address the Bureau of Extension, Chapel Hill, N. C.

The North Carolina Library Commission will furnish traveling package libraries on the question upon the request of the principal of the school. Address Miss Minnie W. Leatherman, Secretary, Raleigh, N. C.

Abridged Debater's Handbook Series—"National Defense." Published by the H. W. Wilson Company, White Plains, N. Y. Price 25 cents.

Debater's Handbook Series—"National Defense." Each School should have a copy of this publication of 243 pages issued in October, 1915. Published by the H. W. Wilson Company, White Plains, N. Y. Price $1.

The Wilson Package Library, consisting of articles clipped from magazines, documents and pamphlets, will be loaned upon application to the H. W. Wilson Company, White Plains, N. Y. The charge for the first article sent is 30 cents and for each additional article 5 cents.

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Hon. Wm. J. Bryan—"The People vs. Special Interests." Contained in the *Commoner* for October, 1915. Lincoln, Nebraska. Price of the *Commoner*, single issue 10 cents. This issue also has other material for the negative.

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ASSOCIATIONS AND LEAGUES FURNISHING MATERIAL

The Associations and Leagues listed below publish literature bearing on the question for free distribution. It would be well for debaters to write them for material.

American Association for International Conciliation, 407 W. 117th Street, New York.

American Defense League, 15 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

American Defense Society, 303 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

American League to Limit Armaments, Room 509, 43 Cedar Street, New York, N. Y.

American Legion, Room 303, Maritime Building, 10 Bridge Street, New York, N. Y.

American Peace and Arbitration League, A. B. Humphrey, Secretary, 31 Nassau Street, New York, N. Y.

American Peace Society, 31 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

American School Peace League, 405 Marlborough Street, Boston, Mass.

American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, Baltimore, Md.

Anti-Enlistment League, Jessie Wallace Hughan, Secretary, 61 Quincy Street, Brooklyn, N. Y.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 Jackson Place, Washington, D. C.

Chicago Peace Society, 30 N. Lasalle Street, Chicago, Ill.

Church Peace Union, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

International Peace Forum, 18 E. 41st Street, New York, N. Y.

International School of Peace, 29 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. Mohonk Lake, N. Y.

League to Enforce Peace, William H. Short, Secretary, 507 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Massachusetts Peace Society, 31 Beacon Street, Boston, Mass.

National Anti-Armament Association, Mr. L. H. Wood, Secretary, 43 Cedar Street, New York, N. Y.

National Security League, Henry L. West, Secretary, 31 Pine Street, New York, N. Y.

Navy League of the United States, Southern Building, Washington, D. C.

New York Peace Society, 507 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y.

Woman's Peace Party, 1105 16th Street, Washington, D. C.

World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Mass.